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INTRODUCTION
The problem of holding transnational corporations (TNCs) liable
for corrupting behavior has grown increasingly urgent. With the largest
TNCs headquartered in the United States, Europe, and Japan, a single
multinational firm today can wield as much economic power and influ-
ence as an entire nation.' The World Bank Institute estimates that TNCs
pay out over one trillion dollars in bribes to foreign officials each year.
In some countries, illegal payments have become highly institutional-
ized. For example, in India's trillion dollar economy, three-quarters of
all freight is transported on the nation's highway system. Transporta-
tion companies find they must pay bribes at every phase of their
business, from registering their vehicles, to obtaining and renewing
interstate and national permits, to paying inspectors who demand in-
formal payments when collecting taxes on goods brought into an area.
It is estimated companies pay local traffic police and road transport
officials in India more than $4.5 billion dollars in bribes annually.3
Prior to the late 1970s, bribery by a TNC of a foreign official was
regarded by many as a necessary evil to protect or obtain foreign busi-
ness. Although bribery has always been universally condemned as
• 4
unethical, it was simply the way business was done overseas.5 How-
ever, over the last few decades, clear international legal standards
1. See J.W. HARRINGTON & BARNEY WARF, INDUSTRIAL LOCATION: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 142 (1995) ("The total sales of many MNCs exceed the Gross Na-
tional Product of most small nations (for example, General Motors earned $95 billion
worldwide in 1988, larger than the GNP of Sweden, Indonesia, or Nigeria)."). But see Paul De
Grauwe & Filip Camerman, Are Multinationals Really Bigger than Nations?, 4 WORLD ECON.,
Apr. 2003, at 23.
2. Press Release, World Bank, The Costs of Corruption (Aug. 8, 2004), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
3. See Raja Murthy, Cops Turn Robbers on India's Roads, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsia/KH27Df03.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
4. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 652-53, 679, 694 (Univ. Cal. Press 1984). Tradi-
tionally, one exception to the ethical prohibition against bribery of officials was when it was
deemed necessary during war or for gathering intelligence. Id.; see also EMMERICH DE VAT-
TEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT
AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 376 (London, G.G. & J. Robinson
1797) (1758) ("Seducing a subject to betray his country ... [i]f such practices are at all excus-
able... [they] can be only [excused] in a very just war .... ).
5. Lisa Harriman Randall, Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657, 673 (1997).
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prohibiting bribery of foreign officials have emerged, which all persons
and nations are now obligated to follow. The threat of private suits, par-
ticularly in U.S. courts, is essential to ensuring that TNCs comply with
these standards globally. Victims in the "highest risk" countries, in-
cluding both foreign employees and competitors, often lack effective
remedies elsewhere.6 Many "[i]mpoverished countries, often desperate
for foreign investment, are unable or unwilling to introduce legal
measures" or enforce existing domestic measures, especially civil
remedies against private individuals and corporations.7 Additionally,
the vast majority of public prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) are settled before trial. Between 2002 and 2008,
litigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) resulted in over "$1.2 billion in settlements
and penalties involving more than 30 countries. 8 Settlement not only
results in lower penalties than companies would face at trial, it also
prevents victims from having their day in court and the courts from
establishing important precedent. Even when public prosecutions result
in large settlements, political compromises can still occur. For exam-
ple, in 2009 the German engineering giant Siemens A.G. paid a record
$1.6 billion in criminal and civil fines to the DOJ and SEC.9 Investiga-
tors found that company managers and sales staff used a multi-million
dollar slush fund to influence well-placed government officials in sev-
eral countries around the globe.'0 Despite the overwhelming evidence
6. See Kendra Magraw, Note, Universally Liable? Corporate-Complicity Liability
Under the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 458, 464 (2009) ("Civil-
law countries do not have mechanisms under their national systems to prosecute legal entities,
effectively conferring automatic jurisdiction on the ICC in such proceedings.").
7. See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & Soc'v REV. 635, 637
(2004). But see Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Stop Bribery Everywhere, CORP. COuNS., June 2009, at
80 (arguing that non-enforcement of anti-bribery laws is "pernicious protectionism").
8. Raymund Wong & Patrick Conroy, FCPA Settlements: It's a Small World After All 1
(NERA Econ. Consulting, Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.nera.com/image/
PubFCPASettlements_0109_Final2.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). This study did not in-
clude the most recent Siemens or Halliburton settlements. See generally id.
9. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. LEGIs. 425, 435-36
(2009). This was in addition to the $569 million Siemens AG paid in fines and disgorgement
of profits to the German authorities. Id. at 436. Now more than a dozen other countries have
either forced Siemens to agree to similar settlement terms or are still conducting their own
investigations or prosecutions of the company. Id. at 454-55.
10. See Sirt Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item,
N.Y Ti iEs, Feb. 13, 2009, at BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/
business/worldbusiness/21siemens.htmI (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). The case was first brought
to light by a whistleblower who alleged that from 2002 to 2004, he oversaw an annual bribery
budget of about $40-50 million at Siemens. Id. Affected countries included Argentina, Bang-
ladesh, China, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Id.
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supporting the allegations of systematic and widespread bribery, the
DOJ allowed Siemens to plead to accounting violations not only be-
cause it cooperated with the investigation, but also because pleading
guilty to bribery violations would have barred Siemens from bidding
on U.S. government contracts."
A one-sentence provision in the first Judiciary Act of 1789 may
open up U.S. courts as an alternative avenue for alien plaintiffs to en-
force global anti-bribery norms against TNCs.'2 Originally passed by
Congress as part of Section 9 of the first Judiciary Act, the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS)' 3 granted federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over "all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States." At the outset, the ATS was used
to resolve international disputes involving primarily economic torts
between private parties in a way that best preserved the sovereign
equality between nations. Over the last three decades, however, the
original concept of the "law of nations" has been turned on its head.'5
There has been an explosion of ATS litigation centered almost exclu-
sively on human rights violations. 6 This has unwittingly caused
opinions regarding what constitutes a "violation of the law of nations"
to focus on the continuum of crimes against humanity and to conclude
that only the most "egregious" or "shocking" crimes committed by
state actors are covered by the ATS. 7 Unfortunately, this has created a
"blind spot" to other violations of customary international law (CIL)
such as foreign bribery.
As a result of this distorted view of the statute, few attempts to date
have been made to apply the ATS to foreign bribery. None have been
successful. In the early years of the United States, and as late as 1908,
bribery of a foreign official was commonly understood to violate the
11. See id. at 1.
12. See Andrew W. Davis, Federalizing Foreign Relations: The Case for Expansive
Federal Jurisdiction in Private International Litigation, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1464 (2005); Ralph
G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien
Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 585 (2004)
(arguing there are few effective real-world alternatives to ATS litigation).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The ATS is sometimes referred to as the "Alien Tort
Claims Act" or "ATCA," although there does not appear to be any historical basis for this
appellation and the Supreme Court has consistently referred to the provision as the Alien Tort
Statute. Even the Second Circuit, which started the whole line of modern cases using the latter
designation, has discontinued its use. See Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow
Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 113 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
14. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
15. For a historical discussion of the law of nations, see infra Part 111.
16. For a discussion of modem ATS case law, see infra Part I.
17. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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law of nations." Today, bribery is frequently mentioned in passing as a
precursor to human right violations but the bribe itself is seldom ana-
lyzed as a potential violation of the law of nations.'9 District courts in
Colorado and the Eastern District of New York rejected ordinary fraud
and other illicit banking activity as a violation of the law of nations
outright.2 0 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently al-
lowed "aiding and abetting" to proceed as a CIL violation under the
ATS, in large part because of language in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development's Anti-Bribery Convention.2
Finally, in early 2009 the Southern District of New York could have
been convinced that bribery violates international law but lacked the
necessary data to so hold. These decisions suggest that federal courts
are primed to conclude foreign bribery is actionable under the ATS in
the near future, a development as yet unaddressed in the legal litera-
ture. 23
In the process of applying the ATS to foreign bribery, this Article
will examine several unresolved issues surrounding this statutory grant.
It will seek to (1) determine what constitutes a "violation of the law of
nations," (2) refute the proposition that private defendants may be
prosecuted under the ATS for only the most shocking and egregious jus
cogens violations, (3) determine when and to what extent state action is
required in ATS litigation, and (4) examine the limitations of the fun-
damental principles of international law on ATS litigation.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the modern ATS case
law including the most recent ATS trials. The U.S. Supreme Court has
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taraborrelli, 19 Pa. D. 235, 241 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1910).
19. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting the district
court's refusal to accept evidence that Pfizer had bribed Nigerian officials, based on a lack of
personal knowledge). See generally Flomo v. Bridgestone Americas Holdings, Inc., No. 1:06-
CV-00627-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 1456736 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009) (denying discovery of
evidence supporting allegations of official demands for a bribe not to report child labor viola-
tions as irrelevant unless tied to the "worst forms of child labor"). Thirty-eight published
federal court decisions mention both the ATS and bribery as of March 1, 2010. A list of these
cases is on file with the author.
20. See Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 E Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Maugein v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 298 F Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2004).
21. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F3d 254, 273-74, 325 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (citing Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, opened for
signature Dec. 18, 1997, OECD Doc. No. DAFFEIME/BR(97)20 (Nov. 21, 1997)).
22. See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F Supp. 2d 382, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(dismissing plaintiff's claim on other grounds based on sovereign immunity under FSIA).
23. But see Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why Egregious
International Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 131, 134 n.17 (2006) (arguing that large-scale corporate fraud
involving "egregious deception" and resulting in "serious damage to the world economy"
should be cognizable under the ATS).
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made clear that the scope of tort claims brought under the ATS can
theoretically expand as the present-day law of nations evolves. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has also emphasized a series of factors that
effectively limit the statute's application and ensure that it does not
jeopardize foreign relations or unduly burden U.S. courts or businesses.
Today these modern international law principles are embodied in doc-
trines such as the act of state doctrine, political question doctrine,
forum non conveniens, exhaustion, and comity. Ultimately, however,
more mundane factors such as the plausibility standard for pleadings
will likely pose the greatest obstacle for future ATS litigation.
To set the stage for a discussion of whether the ATS may be ap-
plied to cases predicated on foreign bribery, Part II recounts the
dramatic impact foreign bribery has had historically here in the United
States and globally. Part III then reconstructs the Founding Fathers'
original understanding of the law of nations. It argues that the writings
of Emmerich de Vattel had the greatest influence on the early United
States. From this historical vantage point, it is clear that federal courts
ought to give judicial cognizance to what Vattel calls "perfect" rights as
part of the law of nations.24 While perfect rights generally arise out of
state-to-state relations, they often also involve private actors and affect
individuals. To that extent, the drafters of the ATS likely intended that
those private actors be subject to civil suits brought by the affected
aliens. Vattel also suggested that all nations may be presumed to have
universal jurisdiction over the violation of certain other rights and obli-
gations.3 Accordingly, the first Congress likely intended that the ATS
provide a private right of action to litigate these offenses as well.
Beyond these two narrow sets of actionable rights, this Article also
explores Vattel's suggestion that imperfect rights or incommensurable
moral values (that is, those concerns not yet universally recognized in
positive law) are better addressed outside U.S. courts.26 A wide range of
alternative international fora has recently emerged to help evolve
international law. These range from international arbitrators to public-
private sector working groups. Once these multilateral efforts
successfully establish a new international norm, then and only then
may the norm be added to the list of perfect or universal rights that
federal courts can recognize as actionable under the ATS.
Part IV uses the above analytical framework to show that foreign
bribery is a violation of the law of nations that should be actionable
under the ATS. Bribery has long been considered a crime against the
24. See VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxii.
25. See id. at 108--09.
26. See id. at vi-vii, 144-45.
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state. Its status as CIL is evidenced by the fact that every country today
has anti-bribery laws on the books. Moreover, foreign bribery has been
universally criminalized in at least seven international anti-bribery
conventions, the most recent agreement including a mandate for each
nation to provide a private civil remedy. Therefore, this Article argues
that an alien should be able to bring an ATS action predicated solely on
foreign bribery for personal or economic injuries, regardless of
whether the bribery gives rise to more serious jus cogens offenses.
Such ATS actions may be brought against either U.S. or foreign per-
sons or TNCs. Since foreign bribery inherently involves complicity
with a foreign government official, no further state action is required.
Alternatively, foreign bribery implicates fundamental norms of such
mutual concern that it merits treatment as a jus cogens offense. This
Article concludes by reemphasizing how federal courts are uniquely
situated to help deal with this worldwide problem.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MODERN ATS
The Alien Tort Statute currently provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. 27 This language in Section 1350 confers federal subject
matter jurisdiction when three conditions are met: (1) an alien sues, (2)
for a tort (3) committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States .'28
The ATS was actually one of three specialized measures taken by
the first Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to extend federal court
subject matter jurisdiction over international disputes. Federal courts
had previously asserted common law jurisdiction over suits alleging
breaches of the law of nations. The ATS codified and extended their
reach, granting federal court jurisdiction over suits by alien plaintiffs 9
27. The ATS is now codified, with only minor grammatical changes, at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000). The original read:
[T]he district courts shall have ... cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (1784); see also
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-30 (2004) ("For two centuries we have affirmed
that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.... It would take
some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any intema-
tional norm intended to protect individuals.").
Winter 20101
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At the same time the Judiciary Act reinforced the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction over suits brought by diplomats, 30 and created
alienage jurisdiction over actions between U.S. and foreign parties.3 '
The possibility of a tort remedy being brought by an alien under
the ATS for injury or harm, here or abroad, by U.S. or foreign viola-
tors, was recognized in two early opinions of the Attorney General and
in several early judicial opinions." Surprisingly though, the ATS was
successfully used to obtain jurisdiction in only two published cases
prior to 1980."3 In a third case, O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, the Su-
preme Court suggested in passing that the ATS may be applicable to a
claim that a U.S. officer illegally seized alien property in a foreign
state. 3
Prior to 1980, fewer than twenty other published federal cases
mentioned even unsuccessful attempts by plaintiffs to invoke the ATS.35
30. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. Despite the broad terms in Sec-
tion 11 empowering federal courts to hear any cases in which "an alien is a party," the
Supreme Court held in Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 304 (1809), that alienage
jurisdiction, absent constitutional authority, was limited to suits involving an alien and a U.S.
citizen. Id.; see also Dennis J. Mahoney, A Historical Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 725, 731-32 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Wilson v. Pierce, 30 F. Cas. 150, 154 (N.D. Cal. 1852) (No. 17,826) ("If
the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court be excluded from its operation, the only cases
cognisable by the district courts to which it can apply, are suits against foreign consuls, and
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United
States"); United States v. Greene, 26 F. Cas. 33, 33 (C.C.D. Maine 1827) (No. 15,258) (Story,
J.) ("[Section 9 of the Judiciary Act] gives no right to any individual to sue in those courts,
with the single exception of causes 'where an alien sues for a tort only."'); M'Grath v. Can-
dalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8810) ("If an alien sue here for a tort under the law
of nations or a treaty ... the suit will be sustained."); Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magda-
lena, 13 F Cas. 356, 358 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 7216) ("[T]he powers of the district courts are
expressed ... as to civil causes ... where an alien sues for a tort only."); 26 Op. Att'y Gen.
250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). See generally Jordan J. Paust, The His-
tory, Nature, and Reach ofthe Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 250 n.3 (2004).
33. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (upholding ATS jurisdiction over a
child-custody suit between Lebanese nationals because the unlawful taking of a minor child
from the custody of her father was a tort, and the use of a falsified passport, concealing the
child's identity and nationality, and wrongfully transporting the child across a border violated
the law of nations); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (upholding
ATS jurisdiction over an action for the return or restitution of slave property which was on a
Spanish vessel seized as a prize of war). But see Abdullah v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir.
2009) (stating that "the statute provided jurisdiction in just two cases during the first 191 years
after its enactment" but citing only Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F3d 767 (6th Cir. 2007)); Taveras,
477 F.3d at 771 (mentioning that there are two cases but discussing only the Bolchos case);
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (stating that there has been only one case).
34. O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908).
35. See Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HuM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2003) (citing twenty-one invo-
cations of the ATS from 1789 until the decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980)); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims, 18
[Vol. 31:385
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Interestingly, all but three of these cases were brought after World War
11.36 The only favorable post-WWII evidence is dicta in Nguyen Da Yen
v. Kissinger, a case involving the alleged illegal evacuation of children
from Vietnam by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).37 In that case, the Ninth Circuit noted that injuries accruing as a
result of the evacuation might be addressed pursuant to the ATS but the
plaintiffs had not asserted a claim under the statute 8
On June 30, 1980, the Second Circuit decided the seminal case of
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala .39 The case involved the torture of a Paraguayan
citizen by his own government's Inspector General of Police.40 The
court maintained it had jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he law of
nations forms an integral part of the common law."4' The Court went on
to hold torture was a "well-established, universally recognized norm[]
of international law" and, to the extent it was done under color of state
law, was actionable under the ATS. 2
After Filartiga, well over one hundred ATS suits were filed in U.S.
courts.4 3 Most significantly, liability under the ATS was extended to
corporations." This led to more robust attempts to use the ATS to
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 n.15 (1985) (listing-prior to June 30, 1980, when Filartiga
was decided-twenty-one cases in which the plaintiff invoked original jurisdiction under the
ATS, and one case in which the plaintiff suggested the ATS as a jurisdictional basis but failed
to adequately brief the issue); Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The
Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 437 (2002) (stating that about
twenty of the approximately one hundred cases available online asserting jurisdiction under
the ATS predated Filartiga).
36. The earliest case in this group was from 1958. See Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp.
390 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
37. See Nguyen DaYen v. Kissinger, 528 E2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. See id. (noting that "the illegal seizure, removal and detention of an alien against his
will in a foreign country... may well be may well be a tort in violation of the 'law of nations'
... [but that the court was] reluctant to decide the applicability of § 1350 to th[e] case without
adequate briefing"); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern
Transnational Enterprise: Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 3, 13 (2003).
39. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. See id. at 878.
41. Id. at 888.
42. Id. at 878.
43. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 263 (2005); Stephens, supra note 35, at 437 (re-
porting "more than one hundred" suits filed since 1980).
44. See Stephens, supra note 35, at 437 (arguing that Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995) reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d. Cir. 1996), remanded to Jane Doe I v. Karadzic,
No. 93 Civ. 9878, 1996 WL 194298 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996), cert. denied, Karadzic v. Kadic,
518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (holding that some international norms apply to private actors) "paved
the way for litigation against corporations").
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confer jurisdiction. 5 However, Filartiga did more than simply increase
the number of ATS claims by expanding the scope of potential targets.
It caused future litigants and other courts to view the ATS differently:
through the sensationalized lens of Filartiga, the ATS became known
first and foremost as a remedy for human rights violations. Conse-
quently, modern courts declined to apply the ATS in the ever-growing
context of private international law. For example, courts declined to
apply the ATS in purely commercial contexts. 6 They also held that
plaintiffs could not state ordinary corporate fraud and conversion
claims under the ATS. 4' Even among those courts willing to find corpo-
rate liability under the statute, several limited corporate liability to
particularly shocking jus cogens offenses or boot-strapped a "state ac-
45. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 E3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs alleging in
the lower court that defendants had violated the law of nations by generating pollution in Peru
and Ecuador, but court dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,
239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2001), remanded to No. 97 Civ. 2858, 2005 WL 287397 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb 3, 2005), rev'd and remanded, 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1282
(2007) (plaintiffs alleging that the defendants violated the law of nations by knowingly pur-
chasing property illegally seized by the Egyptian government on the basis of religious
discrimination, but the court holding that religious discrimination does not constitute a viola-
tion, unless the actor is acting under color of law or is a state official); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 E Supp. 2d 289, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiffs alleging
that the defendant collaborated in torture, enslavement, war crimes, and genocide effectuated
by the Sudanese government); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (plaintiffs alleging that a private mining enterprise had cooperated with the government
of Papua New Guinea to displace villages, cause environmental damage, and commit other
abuses and war crimes); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in
part, revd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g granted, 395 F3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), dismissed, 403 F3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding Unocal liable under the
ATS because its managers directed the Myanmar military to guard and perform other services
associated with its pipeline project despite knowing that forced labor was occurring).
46. See, e.g., Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D.
Colo. 2004) (rejecting ATS claims brought by a consultant alleging defamation); Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F Supp. 2d 424, 485 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that "responsibility for re-
solving forced labor claims arising out of a war is constitutionally committed to the political
branches of government, not the judiciary"); Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F Supp.
60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980) (concluding Iranian diplomats' libel suit did not allege "any violation of
'the law of nations' as the term has been interpreted by the courts").
47. See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1047 (1996) (holding corporate fraud, and misappropriation of funds is not a viola-
tion of international law sufficient to state a claim under the ATS, even when the converted
monies were used to commit various crimes including foreign bribery); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F2d 1001, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1975), remanded to 411 F Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that corporate fraud was not a violation of any international norm, and was therefore
not a cognizable tort under the ATCA); Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 E Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (holding that corporate fraud was not a violation of an international norm, and was
therefore not a cognizable tort under the ATCA).
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tor" requirement onto their analysis.4 ' The result was an incoherent,
seemingly arbitrary, line of decisions regarding the ATS.49
To make matters worse, the lower courts were divided over the fun-
damental question of whether the term "law of nations" referred only to
those norms widely recognized in 1789 or whether it might have in-
cluded new causes of action.0 The Second Circuit in Filartiga gave an
elastic interpretation to the ATS, concluding that it encompassed con-
temporary causes of action.5' Although other circuits generally followed
suit with Filartiga,52 the D.C. Circuit emerged sharply divided in its in-
terpretation of the ATS.53 In a split panel decision, Judge Bork
constrained the scope of the ATS to include only three causes of action
that were well recognized at the time it was passed in 1789, ' effectively
excluding any cause of action allowing a private party to recover for a
human rights violation.55
Legal scholars were also divided over the issue. Some scholars em-
phasized the "conventional" aspect of the law of nations, and posited that
post-Erie federal courts may only recognize causes of action expressly
authorized in legislation or self-executing treaties. 6 This position did not
48. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (declining
to address whether state action is required to sustain an action for an individual human rights
violation under the ATS because the plaintiff's conclusory allegations failed to satisfy the
pleading standard); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (holding in a torture case that unless there is some
state involvement, private parties can only be held liable for activities that violate norms of
"universal concern" such as slavery, genocide, and war crimes); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d
691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the ATS applies "only to shockingly egregious violations
of universally recognized principles of international law").
49. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that "nei-
ther Congress nor the Supreme Court ha[d] definitively resolved the complex and
controversial questions regarding the meaning and scope of the ATCA").
50. Compare Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
the ATS includes new causes of action under the present-day law of nations), and Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996) (stating that
the ATS includes new causes of action under the present-day law of nations), and Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the ATS includes new causes of
action under the present-day law of nations), with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Bork, J., concurring) (finding that the law of nations is
limited to causes of action that would have been contemplated in 1789).
51. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 ("[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.").
52. See Beth Stephens, Comment. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door Is Still Ajar"
for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 537 (2004).
53. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774; Stephens, supra note 35, at 537.
54. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
55. Id. at 813.
56. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 lARV. L. REV. 815
(1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617 (1997).
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turn on the original intent of the ATS; rather its proponents insisted it
was mandated by the Erie doctrine that emerged in the mid-twentieth
century. 7 This Revisionist position maintained that, "in the absence of
federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal
law."58
Other scholars asserted that the Supreme Court's post-Erie decision
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino upheld federal court authority
to recognize certain universal rights under the federal common law en-
clave of "foreign affairs."59 Thus, according to this Modernist view, new
federal common law causes of action could be derived from CIL.60 Be-
cause most modern ATS litigation involved human rights violations,
some modernists misconstrued the case law to mean that universal rights
under CIL could involve only a few shocking or horrid offenses.6'
In 2004, the Supreme Court attempted to provide some much needed
guidance on the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.62 There, the plaintiff,
Alvarez-Machain, claimed that he had been wrongfully abducted in
Mexico and brought to the United States to stand trial for having played
an active role in the torture of a DEA agent in Guadalajara. The plaintiff
claimed that short-term, "arbitrary" detention violated an international
norm.63 The Court held the plaintiff had no cause of action under the ATS
since the norm he advanced "expresse[d] an aspiration that exceeds any
binding customary law rule having the specificity that [the court] re-
quire[d].'64
57. See Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 1626.
58. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 57, at 870.
59. See Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Inter-
national Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295, 302; Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State
Law? Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1842 (1998); Beth Stephens, The Law of the Land: Customary
International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 440-41 (1997)
(maintaining that CIL is federal common law even after Erie).
60. See Brilmayer, supra note 59, at 302; Koh, supra note 59, at 1830; Stephens, supra
note 59, at 440, 450.
61. See Stephens, supra note 59, at 455. The modem conception of jus cogens offenses
has been plagued by the same circular reasoning.
62. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Sosa is one of only three Supreme
Court opinions that mentions the ATS. Id.; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (up-
holding habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims by various detainees at Guantanamo Bay, who
challenged the legality of their detention by the United States government); Argentine Repub-
lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (involving a claim seeking damages
from Argentina for having bombed a British tanker in violation of international norms during
the Falklands War, but the court dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds).
63. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
64. Although potentially circular in its reasoning, this determination was consistent
with the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain in which it upheld the
legality of foreign bounty hunters to abduct criminal defendants abroad and bring them to the
United States for prosecution. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). In that case, however, the Court did not
discuss the implications of customary international law (CIL). Id.
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The Court further held in Sosa that the ATS is "strictly jurisdic-
tional ' 65 and would have been understood by the first Congress to cover
only "those torts corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses:
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy." 6 Nevertheless, the Court did not circumscribe ATS claims to
include only these offenses,67 but instead concluded that nothing had
categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim for torts
committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the "pre-
sent-day law of nations. '8
The Supreme Court declined to formulate a comprehensive list of
the applicable causes of action. Instead, it argued that any newly recog-
nized violation of the law of nations should (1) "rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world," and (2) be "de-
fined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms" that the Court had recognized.69 It further required that the
norm must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (for example, a pri-
vate actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.70 According to the majority, these
norms are enforceable through a federal court's exercise of "residual
[federal] common law discretion" to create causes of action.7 '
The Court in Sosa carefully tempered its unprecedented support for
the judicial cognizance of new ATS claims by listing five "good reasons"
why courts should exercise "great caution" when recognizing new
claims.72 The Court counseled that "the determination [of] whether a
norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and,
indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the prac-
tical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the
federal courts.""'
In the end, the Court in Sosa envisioned a "relatively modest set of
actions alleging violations of the law of nations"74 and left it to the lower
courts to exercise considerable judicial restraint and develop the federal
common law to reflect the precise contours of these international law-
65. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
66. Id. at 723.
67. See id. at 723-25.
68. Id. at 725; see also id. at 733 (stating that plaintiff's claim "must be gauged against
the current state of international law").
69. Id. at 725.
70. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733, n.20 (2004).
71. Id. at 738.
72. Id. at 725-28. These included: (1) the prevailing positivist approach to the common
law, (2) Erie limits on federal common law; (3) the general presumption against implied pri-
vate rights of action; (4) the potential for adverse foreign policy consequences; and (5) the
lack of a congressional mandate to engage in judicial lawmaking in this area. Id.
73. Id. at 732-33. For further discussion of these five factors, see infra Part II(C)(4).
74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
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based claims.7' The Court expressly rejected the Revisionist notion that
"the ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without
a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action, 76
and left the door to new ATS claims "ajar subject to vigilant doorkeep-
ing."" In his concurrence, Justice Scalia warned that Sosa opened the
door to extending federal common law to the full extent of conventional
and customary international law.78
The response of the lower courts to the Sosa decision over the last
five years has been mixed. The Second Circuit has continued to take the
lead by recognizing that claims against private actors such as TNCs (in-
cluding aiding and abetting claims) are actionable under the ATS. 79 Most
circuits, with the notable exception of the D.C. Circuit, have followed
suit.80 In 2008, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify the
scope of "aiding and abetting" liability under the ATS in American Isuzu
Motors v. Ntsebeza, denying certiorari because it lacked the necessary
quorum to hear the appeal from the Second Circuit. 8'
75. Id. at 728-31.
76. Id. at 714.
77. Id. at 729. As the Sosa court pointed out, no subsequent legal development pre-
cludes recognizing violations of the law of nations under federal common law. Id. at 714.
78. See id. at 739 et seq. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
79. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (finding that the plaintiffs
could plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS to obtain jurisdiction over
TNCs that purportedly collaborated with the government of South Africa in maintaining
apartheid).
80. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F3d 1242, 1247-48
(11 th Cir. 2005), remanded to No. 001-3399-Civ-MORENO, 2007 WL 3054986 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 16, 2007), aff'd, 578 F.3d 1283 (11 th Cir. 2009) (construing a state action requirement for
a claim of torture by looking to Section 1983 claims against the United States for civil rights
violations); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 4224593 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
28, 2007) (discussing how Order 1636, issued on August 13, 2007, reversed an earlier order,
issued on August 22, 2006, and holding aiders and abettors may be vicariously liable for acts
they could not have committed as a principals); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F Supp. 2d 891, 899
(W.D. Tenn. 2005) (noting that private persons can be considered state actors for the purpose
of pursuing a claim of torture). But see Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C.
2005) (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (concluding that
even if torture by private parties acting under "color of law" were actionable under the ATS,
the defendants who had acted as agents of the state would be subject to sovereign immunity);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that traditionally
only states, not persons, could held liable under the ATS, and rejecting the use of Section 1983
jurisprudence to exercise jurisdiction over a claim involving sexual violence, but concluding
that the "plaintiffs [had] fail[ed] to allege adequately either of the two bases upon which color
of law arguably [could] be based-joint action, and proximate cause"); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.,
391 F Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding "the law of nations 'does not reach private
non-state conduct"' (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F2d at 206-07)).
81. Khulumani, 504 F3d 254.
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At the same time courts have felt duly restrained by the Sosa opinion
not to recognize every wrong as a violation of the law of nations. Be-
yond the Sosa court's two primary requirements of universality and
specificity, the circuit courts have continued to emphasize that the norm
must arise out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.83
Issues concerning how the ATS interacts with newer statutes have
also arisen. For example, several circuits have grappled with how the
ATS interacts with the more recent Terrorism and Violence Prevention
Act of 1991 (TVPA). 4 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have
concluded that the TVPA is supplementary to the ATS, 5 while the Sev-
enth Circuit has held that the TVPA "occup[ies] the field" and cannot be
pled concurrently with the ATS.
86
Another concern is whether U.S. government officials enjoy absolute
immunity for acts taken abroad under the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the
Westfall Act. Lesser foreign ministers acting in their official capacity in
the United States are protected under the FSIA as "agenc[ies]" or "in-
strumentalit[ies]" of the state, at least in a majority of the federal
82. See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the norm prohibit-
ing the detention of a foreign national without informing him of the requirement of consular
notification and access under Article 36(l)(b)(3) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions was insufficiently universal to support a claim under the ATS); see also Vietnam Ass'n
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (con-
cluding that the ATS did not support a claim against the manufacturers and suppliers of a
herbicide used by U.S. troops because the plaintiffs could not establish the intentionality re-
quired by a customary international norm proscribing the purposeful use of poison as a
weapon against human beings).
83. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings constitutes a univer-
sally accepted norm of CIL "of mutual concern to states," and is consequently within the
jurisdiction of the ATS); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, uni-
versal, and obligatory-") (emphasis added) (quoted favorably in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
84. See generally Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien
Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1398-1401
(2008).
85. See Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the TVPA
and ATS serve a common purpose and may be plead together); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F3d
371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009) (tacitly accepting that ATS and TVPA
claims may be brought together); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d
1242, 1250 (11 th Cir. 2005) (ATS and TVPA claims can be brought concurrently based on
separate meaning of "torture" in each act).
86. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(l)-(2) (2000) (amending the FrCA by broadening the scope
of immunity to include absolute immunity for all acts of government employees taken within
the scope of their office or employment, other than those in violation of the Constitution or
those for which recovery against a government officer is specifically authorized by statute).
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circuits." However, most courts have allowed suits to be brought against
these lower ranking government officials, in their individual capacity, for
conduct outside the scope of their official duties. 9 The exception is the
D.C. Circuit, which recently concluded that they are immune under the
Westfall Act. 90 The better reading is that the Westfall Act should be con-
strued narrowly so as to allow recovery under the ATS, since the original
purpose of the ATS was likely to provide a judicial remedy for violations
of the law of nations by U.S. officials. 9
To date, only two ATS cases have gone to trial.92 In 2007, in the case
of Romero v. Drummond Co., an Alabama jury became the first to issue a
verdict in an ATS case brought against a corporation. 93 The corporate
defendant was accused of aiding and abetting Colombian paramilitaries
in committing human rights violations amounting to "war crimes" in
Colombia.9' Although the company was acquitted on all charges, the fact
that a case built upon accomplice liability had even made it to trial sent
shock waves through corporate America.9- In 2009, a second suit was
filed against the Drummond coal company, again in the Northern District
88. See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ex-
plaining that foreign officials are protected under the FSIA from liability for acts taken in their
official capacity in the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits but not in the Seventh and
Fourth Circuits). The Supreme Court is expected to decide in Yousuf v. Samantar whether the
FSIA extends to an individual acting in his official capacity and whether an individual no
longer an official at the time suit is filed retains said immunity. 552 F3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S.Ct 49 (2009).
89. Id.
90. See In re Iraq and Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007). See
generally Stephen Satterfield, Note, Still Crying Out for Clarification: The Scope of Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute After Sosa, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 216, 236-38 (2008).
91. That the Westfall Act should be construed narrowly is supported by its legislative
history. See H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949
("If an employee is accused of egregious misconduct, rather than mere negligence or poor
judgment, then the United States may not be substituted as the defendant, and the individual
employee remains liable.") (emphasis added).
92. See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11 th Cir. 2008); Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 557 F Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008). But see Licea v. Curacao Drydock, 584 F
Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (entering a nonjury default judgment for $80 million); Hawa
Abdi Jama, Abu Bakar, Cecilia Kou Jeffrey, Jeyakumar Anantharajah, Abraham Kenneth,
Dennis Raji, Shamimu Nanteza, Agatha Serwaa, and Sarah Tetteh Yower v. Esmor Correc-
tional Services Inc., James Slattery, Willard Stovall, John Lima, Diane McClure, Richard
Staley, and Phillip Johnson, 2007 WL 4592686 (Verdict and Settlement Sum-
mary) (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007) (NO. 97-CV-03093-DRD-MAS) (jury rejecting the ATS claim
but finding the corporation liable for $100,001 on non-ATS grounds).
93. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1303.
94. Third Amended Complaint, Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. CV-03-BE-575-
W, 2006 WL 5186500 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2004).
95. See Faith E. Gay & J. Noah Hagey, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 25, 2007); Jonathan Drimmer, Don't Be Dubbed a Human Rights
Abuser, LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 22, 2007); Ken Stier, Suing Multinationals over Murder TIME
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2007).
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of Alabama.96 This time plaintiffs have alleged corporate complicity with
right-wing paramilitary squads in the murders of sixty-three men and
four women between 1999 and 2006.9'
The other trial was Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., in which several mem-
bers of a small Nigerian village accused one of the world's largest oil
companies of human rights violations. Chevron was accused of being
involved in the shooting deaths of two activists at an offshore oil plat-
form in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in 1998."8 On December 1, 2008, after
a four-week trial and eight and a half years of litigation, a San Francisco
jury decided in favor of the defendants. 99 The outcome of that trial is now
on appeal.
A third ATS case, Wiwa v. Shell, survived more than ten years of le-
gal challenges and almost went to trial in 2009.' 00 It involved the
execution of Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-Wiwa and other envi-
ronmentalist activists in Nigeria.'0 ' The suit was filed by the Center for
Constitutional Rights and EarthRights International in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. The plaintiffs accused the British oil company, Royal
Dutch Shell, and the head of its Nigerian operations, Brian Anderson, of,
among other things, requesting, assisting, and financing Nigerian sol-
diers' use of deadly force and massive, brutal raids against the Ogoni
people throughout the early 1990s to repress a growing movement
against the oil company.'02 They also accused Shell of conspiring to bribe
two witnesses to testify against Saro-Wiwa during his trial, which re-
sulted in the death penalty.' 3 In June 2009, the parties agreed to settle the
case for $15.5 million.' 4
96. Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages, Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., et al.
(N.D. Ala. May 28, 2009).
97. Id.
98. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
99. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506, 2009 WL 1081096, at *1 (N.D. Cal.,
Apr. 22, 2009).
100. See Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, No. 08-1803-CV, 2009 WL
1560197 (2d Cir. June 3, 2009); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01
Civ.1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 928297 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
2009).
101. See Sam Kennedy, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million in Nigerian Human Rights Case,
FRONTLINE WORLD, June 10, 2009, available at http://www.pbs.orglfrontlineworld/stories/
bribe/2009/06/shell-settles- 15-million-in-nigerian-human-rights-case.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2009).
102. See Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria, No. 08-1803-CV, 2009 WL
1560197, at *1 (2d Cir. June 3, 2009).
103. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000).
104. See Kennedy, supra note 101. Separately, the DOJ and SEC are investigating Shell's
dealings in Nigeria with Panalpina, a freight forwarding company accused of bribing Nigerian
customs officials on Shell's behalf in violation of the FCPA. See ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC,
ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 20-F FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 16, available
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The frequency of ATS suits has dramatically increased in recent
years and there is no indication that the number of ATS filings will de-
cline any time soon. Many prominent TNCs, including Bridgestone/
Firestone, Caterpillar, Chevron, Chiquita, Coca-Cola, DaimlerChrysler,
Exxon, Gap, Nestle, Pfizer, Texaco, UBS, and Yahoo, have been sued in
federal court under the ATS. However, there is a danger that this trend
may lead to a backlash: there is already some indication that federal
courts are beginning to more closely scrutinize ATS claims at the out-
set.' 5 To avoid an overreaction, lower courts should strive to strike the
balance called for under Sosa, preventing illegitimate claims while at the
same time recognizing new causes of action under the ATS that vindicate
emerging international norms like the prohibition of foreign bribery.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE BRIBERY
In the late eighteenth century, the bribery of federal officials was
outlawed in the United States. Bribery was considered as much a crime
against the federal government as piracy. ' 6 Bribery is even one the
named offenses in the Constitution upon which impeachment of the
President of the United States may be based.' 7 On April 30, 1790 Con-
gress passed "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes" that
included a section dealing with the bribery of federal officials.' 8
Even prior to the passage of that Act, federal courts entertained cases
involving bribery as a violation of both the common law of the United
States and the law of nations. For example, Chief Justice John Jay deliv-
ered a charge to a grand jury in New York District Court instructing the
grand jurors to "[d]irect your Attention [also] to the Conduct of the na-
tional officers, and let not [] any Corruptions[,] Frauds[,] Extortions[,] or
at http://www.annualreportandform20f.shell.conm/2008/servicepages/downloads/files/entire-
shell 20f_08.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). Other confidential ATS settlements include
Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No.4:07-CV-02151-CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007), Doe v. Reddy, No.
C 02-05570 WHA, 2004 WL 5512966, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2004), and Does I v. Gap,
Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2002 WL 1000073, at *10 (D.N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002).
105. For a discussion of the application of the plausibility standard of pleadings, see
infra Part II(C)(4).
106. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1039 (1985); Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 26, 62 (1978).
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
108. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9,
§ 21, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14 (1790) (expired 1801). This Crimes Act of 1790 also dealt with
piracy, assaults on ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts, which are widely seen as
violations of the law of nations. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien
Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,
242-43 (1996).
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criminal Negligences[,] with which you may find any of them justly
chargeable, pass unnoticed."' '° Similarly, in United States v. Ravara, a
consul from Genoa was successfully prosecuted for attempting to extort
money from a British minister." " In 1798, Robert Worral was prosecuted
under federal common law for bribery of a Federal Commissioner of
Revenue."'
Even once it was widely accepted that federal courts had no com-
mon law jurisdiction in criminal matters, state courts continued to treat
bribery as a violation of the law of nations, which was to be incorporated
into the municipal law of the state.'12 For example, in 1910, the Pennsyl-
vania Court of Quarter Sessions held in Commonwealth v. Taraborrelli
that the defendant's attempt to corrupt an Italian consul residing in the
United States, or his subordinate, with a bribe to obtain an exemption
from military service violated not only the provisions of a consular con-
vention or treaty between the United States and Italy but also "[tihe
principles of the law of nations."''
3
Prosecutions for bribery began to take on a new fervor in the 1920s
and 1930s with the convictions of an ex-cabinet official and a federal
judge.'"4 Albert Bacon Fall, Secretary of the Interior, was convicted of
bribery in the acquisition of contracts and leases by the Pan-American
Petroleum and Transport Company."' In 1939, one of the most respected
federal appeals court judges in the country, Martin T. Manton, resigned
after allegations surfaced of his receipt of bribes in six separate cases;
109. John Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New
York, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1800, at 30
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1988); see also Ruth Wedgewood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jona-
than Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 243-44 (1990) (quoting a similar charge to a Virginia grand
jury in 1791 suggesting "the general Law of Nations" set the limits of a congressional statute
punishing murder on the high seas even if the criminal was not an American citizen).
110. See Andrew Lenner, A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist Era,
40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 72, 82 (1996) (citations omitted).
111. United States v. Worral, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798); see
Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against the Jefferson-
ians, 62 VAND. L. REV. 349, 367 (2009). Although bribery statutes existed by the time this
case was decided, revenue commissioners were not specifically mentioned; therefore, Worral
was prosecuted "upon the principles of common law." Worral, 2 U.S. at 384, 28 F. Cas. at 778.
However, Judge Samuel Chase was one of the first federal judges to maintain that there was
no federal common law of crimes. Presser, supra, at 367. Furthermore, since this case in-
volved domestic bribery, it did not involve a violation of the law of nations. However, as one
historian noted, "[flew Federalists would ... have been able to separate a violation of the law
of nations from a completely internal matter such as counterfeiting or the bribery of a federal
official." Lenner, supra note 110, at 90.
112. See Commonwealth v. Taraborrelli, 19 Pa. D. 235, 1910 WL 3291 (Pa. Quar. Sess.
1910).
113. Id. at *7.
114. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 565.
115. Fall v. U.S., 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 867 (1931).
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his resignation did not forestall his conviction in 1949 for conspiracy, for
which he received the maximum sentence."6 These two landmark con-
victions marked a tipping point in the prosecution of bribery of public
officials, and ultimately led to the passage of anti-bribery statutes in
thirty-two states between 1947 and 1960, extending to "almost every
class and occupation."
'
"
7
During the mid-1970s the global escalation of corporate corruption
reached another tipping point."' The Watergate investigation, which led
to the resignation of Richard Nixon, revealed that a number of American
corporations had made illegal political contributions during the 1972
presidential campaign.' Upon further investigation Congress and the
SEC discovered U.S. corporations were also making secret contributions
to foreign officials.' 20 These bribery schemes resulted in a series of most
unfortunate events, ranging from the suicide of two high level corporate
executives, to a bribery scandal involving the Honduran President that
precipitated his ouster during a military coup. 2'
Initially, the Congressional hearings focused on Lockheed Martin
(Lockheed), the nation's largest defense contractor. 22 The federal gov-
ernment had loaned the company over $250 million in "bailout" money
and Congress feared that Lockheed's ability to repay depended on its
projected sales figures, which in turn depended on Lockheed's bribery of
foreign officials.' Ultimately, Congress' worst fears were confirmed:
116. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664
(1940).
117. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 579.
118. See Justin Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 286 (2007).
119. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115-16
(1977).
120. Id.
121. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 656. The SEC exposed a scheme by United Brands to
bribe Honduran President Oswaldo L6pez Arellano with $1.25 million, and with the assurance
of another $1.25 million upon the reduction of certain export taxes. Id. Then owner of United
Brands, Eli M. Black, was one of the aforementioned suicides. Id. United Brands was later
sold and renamed Chiquita Brands International.
122. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 654-63.
123. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the fact that the U.S. government has
recently become the majority shareholder in other large American companies such as Ameri-
can International Group, Inc. (AIG) and General Motors, Inc. (GM) may limit enforcement of
anti-bribery laws against these companies. It is possible these companies may be treated as
instrumentalities or agencies of the state for purposes of derivative sovereign immunity. In
conjunction with the foreign country exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), this
may effectively shield these TNCs from liability from private civil actions predicated on their
bribery overseas.
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Lockheed confessed to having made questionable payments amounting
to more than $30 million between 1970 and 1975.24
However, Lockheed was not alone. Between 400 and 500 other pub-
licly traded corporations, or approximately 1.5 percent of American
corporations doing business abroad at the time, admitted to the SEC that,
cumulatively, they had made over $300 million in secret payments to
government officials to influence their official acts so as to obtain sale
contracts or other improper business advantages.'
2
The solution from the U.S. perspective was two-fold. First, Congress
passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. '26 The goal of the leg-
islation was not only to criminalize bribery but also to change corporate
culture. 7 The statute contains anti-bribery provisions covering virtually
all U.S. persons and their agents as well as recordkeeping provisions for
public companies to facilitate the enforcement of the FCPA under securi-
ties laws and regulations. 128 For the first two decades following its
enactment, the FCPA was seldom invoked. 29 However, the DOJ and SEC
have dramatically increased their enforcement efforts over the last ten
years.3 Additionally, there has been a significant rise in the United
States in the amount of civil litigation predicated on FCPA violations.'
Second, with the passage of the FCPA and later amendments the
U.S. Congress attempted to give the concept of bribery universal legal
significance, and largely succeeded. This global effort was, in part, a
response to critics who said that the FCPA would put American busi-
nesses at a competitive disadvantage. 32 By enacting the FCPA, Congress
articulated a clear position that bribery was universally wrong.'33 In 1998
124. Id. at 674. These payments were made in developing countries such as Iran, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in developed countries such as the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Id. at 659-63.
125. See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 640, at. 4 (1977)).
126. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 2006)). For the legislative history of
the FCPA, see S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098; H.R. REP.
95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121.
127. S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977), at 4100 reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
128. The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-
2, 78dd-3 (2006), and its recordkeeping provisions are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ff
(2006).
129. Vega, supra note 9, at 434 (citations omitted) (stating that between 1978 and 2000,
U.S. prosecutors averaged only three FCPA prosecutions per year).
130. Id. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 464-77 (citations omitted).
132. See MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT, at CRS-25 (1999), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/Crsfcpa.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009).
133. S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977), at4100, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
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the FCPA was amended to make clear that the statute applied to U.S.
persons acting within and beyond U.S. borders.3 4 These amendments
also extended the FCPA's jurisdictional reach to any foreign company or
alien acting within the United States or its territories.'35 However, the
United States would not have to go it alone. Immediately following the
Lockheed hearings, several other countries, including the Netherlands,
Italy, and Japan, launched their own investigations leading to arrests,
resignations, indictments, trials, and in some instances, prison terms
ranging from twenty months to four years."'
These unilateral actions were quickly followed by multilateral ef-
forts. The International Chamber of Commerce led the way by
publishing its 1977 Report on Extortion and Bribery in International
Business Transactions, but efforts to convince the United Nations to
adopt an international convention against corruption fell through in the
1980s.'37 After another round of corruption scandals relating to the Sav-
ings and Loan (S&L) Crisis,'38 however, the tide changed. In 1993,
Transparency International was founded and in 1996, the Organization
of the American States entered into the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (OAS Convention), the first multilateral compact for
combating foreign bribery.'3 9 The following year, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention) was opened for signature. A little
over two decades after OECD diplomats had scoffed at bribery as being
unimportant during the 1975 Senate subcommittee hearings, the same
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g) (2009) ("It shall... be unlawful ... to corruptly do any act
outside of the United States in [violation of this section]."); id. § 78dd-2(i) ("It shall also be
unlawful for any United States person to corruptly do any act outside the United States in
[violation of this section]."); id. § 78dd-3(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... while in
the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in [violation of this section].").
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 19-20 (1998) ("[I]t is
expected that the established principles of liability, including principles of vicarious liability
... shall apply ... regardless of the nationality of the officer, director, employee, agent, or
stockholder.").
136. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 467-70.
137. Int'l Chamber of Commerce Comm'n on Anti-Corruption, Combating Extortion
and Bribery: ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/anticorruption/Statements/fCC-Rules ofC
onduct and Recommendations%20_2005 %20Revision.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
138. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic His-
tory of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 278 (2004).
139. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Mar. 29,
1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724.
140. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 4.
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representatives proclaimed the need to prevent bribery's devastating ef-
fects on developing countries.
Since then, there have been several other conventions and instru-
ments evidencing a global standard prohibiting foreign bribery, including
three prominent E.U. Conventions,'4 ' the Asian Development Bank
(ADB)/OECD Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific, 14 2
the African Union (A.U.) Corruption Convention,'4 3 the World Bank
Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy,'" and most recently, the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).'4
The OECD Convention focuses primarily on the criminalization of
bribery; however, the UNCAC, A.U. Convention, OAS Convention,
ABD-OECD Action Plan, and the combined E.U. Conventions take a
more comprehensive approach. 46 They generally call not only for the
criminalization of bribery but also for civil liability of legal persons, pro-
tection for whistleblowers, a long statute of limitations, and
compensation for damages.
47
The results of this internationalization of the prohibition against for-
eign bribery are impressive. Prior to the mid- 1970s overseas bribery was
accepted corporate policy. Today, most TNCs have adopted policies ban-
ning all direct and indirect payments to foreign officials.18 In 1977, the
141. See, e.g., Civil Law Convention on Corruption, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1999,
Europ. T.S. No. 174; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173; Council of Europe, Group of States Against Corruption [GRECO],
GRECO Members & Observers, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/members
_en.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
142. ADB OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: COMBAT-
ING CORRUPTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, ANTI-CORRUPTION PLAN FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/24/35021642.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009).
143. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, opened for
signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter A.U. Convention].
144. The World Bank first imposed a mandatory anti-bribery bidder certification for
large-scale projects in 2004. Eventually, it promulgated its own Governance and Anti-
Corruption Strategy in 2007. See World Bank, Governance and Anticorruption,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040922-menuPK:
34480-pagePK:34370-theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
145. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003) (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026-E.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter UNCAC].
146. Transparency Int'l, What Kinds of Measures Do the Anti-Corruption Instruments
and Conventions Call For?, http://www.transparency.org/global-priorities/intemational-
conventions/conventionsexplained/measures (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
147. Id.
148. Vega, supra note 9, at 455-56. According to a 2008 survey conducted by KPMG,
eighty-four percent of corporations have implemented FCPA or anti-corruption policies
or procedures. See KPMG FORENSIC, 2008 ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
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United States became the first country to pass a law prohibiting bribery
of foreign officials abroad.'49 Since then, many other countries have ex-
ercised similar extraterritorial authority,'50 and virtually every country
has laws on the books prohibiting bribery of its own government offi-
cials and judiciary.''
This new international norm is consistent with the recent, increased
international cooperation in prosecuting foreign bribery'52 and the en-
hanced role of victims in international criminal law. With the adoption of
the Rome Statute in 1998, for example, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has put unprecedented emphasis on the role of victims in the
criminal conviction process.'53 Victims are allowed to participate in nu-
merous stages of a trial, ranging from pre-trial settlement to actual
investigation to eventual award of reparations.'54 The policy considera-
tions driving the promotion of victim participation include a desire to
SURVEY (2008), available at http://us.kpmg.com/RutUS-prod/Documents/8/2008_FCPA_
AntiBriberySurvey.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
149. Vega, supra note 9, at 432-33.
150. See, e.g., Code Penal [Belgium Criminal Code] art. 246 (amended in 2007 to grant
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of bribery committed outside of Belgian territory); ORG.
FOR ECON.CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS,
CZECH REPUBLIC: PHASE 2: REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION OF COMBAT-
ING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 150 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/37727436.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (citing Section 17 of the Czech Criminal Code for the proposition
that "[t]erritorial jurisdiction also applies ... when an offender performs an act outside the
Czech Republic which violates or threatens an interest that is, in whole or in part, inside the
Czech Republic"); OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, FRANCE: PHASE 2:
REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMEN-
DATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS U 120-21
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/36/26242055.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2009) (noting that Articles 113-6 and 113-7 of the French Criminal Law are applicable to
offenses by French citizens acting outside of France or its territories if the acts were punish-
able by the laws of the country where the acts took place and extends the status of "victim" in
cases of bribery not only to the state but also to private associations); OECD, DIRECTORATE
FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, JAPAN: PHASE 2: REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CON-
VENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 37 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/34l7/34554382.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (establishing that under Art. 14-(3) of
Japan's Unfair Competition Prevention Law the offense of bribery of foreign public official
would be subject to nationality jurisdiction in Japanese courts).
151. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 702 ("Bribery is universally shameful. Not a country in
the world which [sic] does not treat bribery as criminal on its lawbooks.") (emphasis omitted).
152. See id.
153. Charles P. Trumbull IV, The Victims of Victim Participation in International Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 29 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 777, 777 (2008).
154. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 203, 245 (2006).
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preserve victims' interests, facilitate restoration of the victims' dignity,
and promote reconciliation. '55
Decisions from other treaty-based organizations have also given vic-
tims' rights an almost inalienable status in international cases. 15'As early
as 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) held that
the state's duty to prosecute implies certain private rights for victims,
including victim participation in enforcement.'57 In 2006, the ICC began
to allow direct victim participation in all court proceedings. 8 In 2008,
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) became
the second international criminal tribunal to do so when it accorded vic-
tims the same rights to participation as other parties.5 9 The IACtHR, ICC
and ECCC victim participation rights are similar in this regard to the
French civil law system, in which victims of serious crime have the right
to join and participate in ongoing criminal prosecutions as parties
civiles, as well as rights to bring civil claims for damages.'
60
Finally, whistleblower protections for victims are also on the rise. In
2007, France introduced whistleblower protection legislation for its
private sector.' 6' In February 2008, South Korea amended its Anti-
Corruption Act to include whistleblower protection in the private
sector.'62 Other countries providing whistleblower protection include
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New
Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.'63
III. REDISCOVERING THE PROPER LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Modern ATS jurisprudence has not yet reached its statutory or con-
stitutional limits. Human rights litigation has monopolized the debate
over what constitutes a violation of the law of nations for purposes of the
ATS for far too long. In order to move forward, stakeholders must
155. Trumbull, supra note 153, at 778.
156. See id. at 784-85.
157. Id. at 785, n.48 (citing Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, atT 174 (July 29, 1988)).
158. See Elizabeth Bingold et al., International Criminal Law, 43 INT'L L. 473, 473
(2009).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 474. ("This right to bring a civil claim before ajuge d'instruction was recog-
nized by the Cour de Cassation as early as 1906.").
161. See FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, PROGRESS REPORT 2009: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 27 (2009).
162. See generally id.
163. Id.
Michigan Journal of International Law
rediscover the proper legal framework in which the ATS was originally
conceived and then synthesize that understanding with the modern rules
governing ATS cases, including the Supreme Court's seminal Sosa deci-
sion.
Historical context is critical to constructing the proper legal frame-
work for a more balanced approach to the ATS. The original
understanding of the statute's key terms can be gleaned from the earliest
ATS judicial opinions and the writings of Emmerich de Vattel, a leading
international law scholar in the late eighteenth century. These sources
suggest the ATS is capable of playing a much more prominent role in
international civil litigation, particularly with regard to disputes in which
public and private rights intersect.
A. Taking a Positivist Approach to a Moral Problem
It is tempting to approach the question of whether the prohibition
against foreign bribery is part of the law of nations as a moral question.
"New" natural law theorists have insisted that whether a nation's law is
unjust, or whether its custom or practice is censurable by the rest of the
international community, cannot be determined apart from a discussion
of various basic and irreducible aspects of human fulfillment.'64 Inc-
ommensurable values-or as John Finnis calls them, "basic goods"-
such as life, knowledge, sociability, and practical reasonableness (or
freedom), can be enjoyed by members of the international community
(so the argument goes) only when a set of conditions that rest on integ-
rity and are free from corruption and bribery is created through law and
government. 165 These scholars view creating this ideal set of conditions
as the joint responsibility of the international community at large.' 66
Similarly, international law scholars deeply entrenched in legal real-
ism, such as those of the so-called New Haven School, have recognized
that moral reasoning and policy choices play a critical role in the whole
164. See, e.g., John Finnis, Law and What I Truly Should Decide, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 107,
112 (2003) (stating "[tihe principles of the rule of law are, at least in their main lines, moral
requirements"); Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 171, 175, 196
(2008) (maintaining that there are certain incommensurable goods the fulfillment of which
natural law theorists contend is the "justifying moral-critical point of law and legal systems,"
but also recognizing that complex legal "questions go beyond the application of moral princi-
ples"). Proponents maintain these "incommensurable goods" demanding human "fulfillment"
are objective values that can be discerned through the exercise of reason.
165. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-89 (1980). In addition to
those listed, Finnis also includes play, aesthetic experience, and religion among the seven
basic goods. Id.
166. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 235-36 (1999) (arguing
that the solution to many global problems requires the coordinated effort of the "complete" or
self-sufficient community because a nation-state is not able to secure a citizens' overall well-
being by itself).
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process of authoritative decisionmaking.6 As Professor Koh put it, "the
'new' New Haven School [has] a renewed commitment to normativity:
the recognition that positive theory should not be studied in isolation
from normative ends.' 68 Most of these scholars judge universal, norma-
tive values by their degree of contribution to human dignity, which they
place at the center of international law.' 69
However, when determining whether foreign bribery violates the
present-day law of nations, modem ATS case law looks beyond moral
and ethical standards. When the Supreme Court found certain interna-
tional laws to be actionable under the ATS, it based that decision on a
more positivist kind of law of nations. The Sosa court noted there has
been a change in the "prevailing conception of the common law" such
that there is now "a general understanding that the law is not so much
found or discovered as it is either made or created.' 70 The Supreme
Court went out of its way in Sosa to reject the idea of law "as a discover-
able reflection of human reason," looking at it instead "in a positivistic
way, as a product of human choice."''
For better or worse, this positivist approach to the law of nations is
consistent with the dominant theory of international law during the early
years of the United States. This Article focuses on the writings of
Emmrich de Vattel because in 1789, when the ATS was enacted, Vattel's
dualist approach to the law of nations was more contemporary than the
other leading international scholars of his day, including Hugo Grotius
or William Blackstone. By that I mean two things. First, as demonstrated
below, Vattel's work was imminently more readable than the others. Per-
haps the best evidence of this is the fact that Vattel's work was
republished more than fifty times. By comparison, the work of Hugo
Grotius was reprinted less than half a dozen times during the century
167. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the "New" Schools: Assessing the Le-
gitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 455,
455-56 (2007).
168. Harold Koh, Is There a "New" New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE
J. INT'L L 559, 569 (2007) (emphasis omittcd).
169. See id. at 563, 572 (arguing for a return to the attitude of post World War II interna-
tional lawyers embodied in the "basic endeavor" of the New Haven School of International
Law to build a "humane world public order ... dedicated to the promotion of human dig-
nity"); W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108 YALE
L.J. 935, 939 (1999). Values contributing to human dignity include affection, respect, well-
being, power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, and rectitude. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S.
McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
377 (1992).
170. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machan, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
171. Id. at 729, 744.
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following the publication of Vattel's work.'72 Second, Vattel articulated a
systematic way to transition from classical natural law theory to modem
CIL at the precise moment in history when the Founding Fathers were
formulating our American legal system. Thus, Vattel's highly readable,
relevant work played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the old
and new philosophies of law and government during the early years of
the United States.
Both legal scholars and the courts, including the Supreme Court,
have recognized the importance of the writings of Emmerich de Vattel to
the Founders' understanding of the law of nations.'73 Vattel's treatise,
THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, was
widely read in America at the time of the passage of the ATS. 74 In 1775,
for example, Benjamin Franklin sent a note to Charles Dumas, an
American diplomat in The Hague, thanking him for "the kind present [of
his] edition of Vattel" and stating: "It came to us in good season, when
the circumstances of a rising State make it necessary frequently to con-
sult the law of nations."'75 Some scholars have argued "that a copy that
Dumas, through Franklin, gave to the Philadelphia public library 'un-
doubtedly was used by members of the Second Continental Congress...
; by the leading men who directed the policy of the United Colonies until
the end of the war; and later by the man who sat in the Convention of
1787 and drew up the Constitution of the United States. '"1 76 This circum-
172. Robert Trout, Vattel, http://east-west-dialogue.tripod.convattel/index.html (last
visited Nov. 23, 2009).
173. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714-16, 723-24 (citing Vattel four times in its attempt to return
CIL to its proper historical context); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434
U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978) ("[Vattel was the] international jurist most widely cited in the first
50 years after the Revolution."); MARK W. JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914, at 4 (2004) ("Blackstone, along with the
Dutchman Grotius, and the Swiss Vattel, were principal sources of international law for early
American lawyers.").
174. See VATTEL, supra note 4. The original French edition was published in 1758, and
the first English edition was published in 1759. Both editions were widely circulated in Amer-
ica. The first American edition appeared in 1796, and was reprinted nineteen times in America
by 1872. See Trout, supra note 172. This Article cites to one of the earliest of these subsequent
editions published in 1797.
175. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles Dumas (Dec. 19, 1775), in 2 THE REVO-
LUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 64, 64 (Francis Wharton
ed., 1889).
176. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 (2009) (citing Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the
Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV.
453, 459 (1936) (quoting Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, at xxx n.I (Charles G. Fenwick
trans., 1916))).
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stantial evidence suggests Vattel's views on the law of nations signifi-
cantly influenced the passage of the ATS. 177
Vattel strongly advocated a positive kind of law of nations. He main-
tained it is "necessary, on many occasions that nations should suffer
certain things to be done, though in their own nature unjust and condem-
nable; because they cannot oppose them by open force, without violating
the liberty of some particular state, and destroying the foundations of
their natural society.' '178 Statements such as this reflected a fundamental
principle of sovereign equality Vattel described as "the natural liberty of
nations"'79 or the "perfect equality of rights between independent na-
tions."'' ° For Vattel, equality was a natural right of sovereign states:
"nations ... are naturally equal and inherit from nature the same obliga-
tions and rights .... [A] small republic is no less a sovereign state than
the most powerful kingdom."''
To apply this principle, Vattel distinguished the natural law of na-
tions (what he called the "necessary" law of nations) from a more
positivist "voluntary" law of nations.'82 The necessary law of nations cor-
responded to a kind of internal law that, while inviolable, only bound the
conscience of a sovereign.13 The voluntary law of nations, on the other
hand, consisted of external rules derived from the nature of state-to-state
relations but morally bound by the necessary law of nations. One source
of these rules, for example, was the principle of non-intervention, which
held that a sovereign state must "govern itself by its own authority and
177. For a discussion of other influential theoretical works and international law treaties
exerting considerable influence in the early years of the United States, including those of Jer-
emy Bentham, William Blackstone, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, Samuel Puffendorf, and Christian Wolff, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGI-
CAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-31 (1967); PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS
ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLU-
TIONS, 1776-1814, at 11-13 (1993); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 259-305 (2d ed. 1998); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 859-65 (1978).
178. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxiv.
179. Id. at xv.
180. Id. at 149; see also id. at 68 ("[A] nation ought not to suffer a foreigner to dictate
laws to her."); id at 156 (stating that the prince of the Inca Athualpa was "not at all account-
able to [the Spaniards]" for the internal care of the government); id. at 160 ("[N]ations ought
not to judge one another."). Other eighteenth-century lawyers understood that the law of na-
tions was needed because the international community lacked any law-enforcing sovereign
standing above all nations. See James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court
for the District of South Carolina, GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, May 12, 1794, reprinted
in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800,
at 459 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) (discussing "[t]he Law of Nations, by which alone all con-
troversies between nation and nation can be determined").
181. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxiii; see also id. at 462.
182. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxii-lxiii.
183. Id. at lxiii-lxvi.
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laws." ''  Together, the "necessary" and "voluntary" branches formed
what Vattel dubbed the "double" law of nations."' The voluntary law
comprised much less than the necessary (or natural) law; however, Vattel
considered that limitation necessary to "avoid greater evils" against the
principle of sovereign equality.1
86
Vattel further divided the positive (or external) body of voluntary
rights and obligations between sovereign nations into "perfect" and "im-
perfect" rights.8 7 Only "perfect" rights, according to Vattel, were
actionable. Violations of imperfect rights, like violations of the internal
law of conscience or even the sacred law, were not actionable.'88 On this
point, Vattel intentionally distanced himself from the classical natural
law theories and even the Republican ideals of his predecessors.'89
In an effort to treat the subject more systematically, Vattel also di-
vided the sources of the law of nations into three branches: conventional,
customary, and universal. First, to the extent that parties agreed to and
signed a treaty or other binding instrument, Vattel thought imperfect or
internal rights could become perfect rights under the "conventional" law
of nations.' 90 Second, a nation's customs and practices constituted "tacit
consent" to certain rights and obligations being treated as perfect (at
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at xvii.
186. Id. at 383.
187. Id. at lxii-lxiii. This idea of perfect rights was also deeply rooted in other well-
known writings on the law of nations referenced by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL
PUDFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 127 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Old-
father trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) ("Now an unjust act, which is done from choice,
and infringes upon the perfect right of another is commonly designated by the one word, in-
jury.") (emphasis added).
188. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxii ("[Tihe imperfect right is unaccompanied by that right
of compulsion.") (emphasis added); id. at lxiii ("[So long as they do not affect the proper and
perfect rights of any other nation ... other nations are bound to acquiesce in her conduct,
since they have no right to dictate to her.").
189. See id. at vii (stating Hobbes "was mistaken in the idea that the law of nature does
not suffer any necessary change" when applied to nations). Furthermore, Vattel agreed with
his mentor, Christian Wolf, that "a rigid adherence to the law of nature cannot always prevail
in that ... society of nations," id. at xv, but thought it unnecessary to adopt Wolf's Republi-
canism ideal of civitas maxima, id. at xiii. Blackstone made a similar distinction between rules
of civil conduct (based on municipal law) and rules of moral conduct (based on the law of
nature and revealed law). See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *45. However, Black-
stone declared that all human laws (including the law of nations and municipal law) depend on
natural law and divine law. Id. at *41-42. In particular, Blackstone believed the law of nations
"depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues,
and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which com-
pacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature." Id. at *43.
190. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxv ("The several engagements into which nations may
enter produce a new kind of law of nations, called Conventional, or of Treaties. As it is evident
that a treaty binds none but the contracting parties, the conventional law of nations is not a
universal but a particular law.").
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least for those nations), unless or until such a nation specifically rejected
the rule as part of the "customary" law of nations.' 9' Finally, as explained
in a footnote by the editors of the American edition of 1849, nations
were presumed to have consented to the "universal voluntary law, or
those rules which are considered to have become law by the uniform
practice of nations in general and by the manifest utility of the rules
themselves"'0 92 In order to rise to the level of a "universal" norm, Vattel
insisted that there must be empirical evidence that a concept be ac-
knowledged by "all civilized nations."' 93
Vattel's three-tiered positive framework for the law of nations went
virtually unchallenged for over a century. During the early years of the
United States, the only notable American to take exception was James
Madison.' 94 Madison suggested treaties should be treated as separate and
independent of the other sources of the law of nations.' 9 Madison's view
must have carried some weight, because the ATS ultimately authorized
tort claims based on a "violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.' 96
Today, the law of nations is generally referred to as CIL."' Some as-
sume the term includes conventional international instruments, such as
treaties, while others suggest CIL only reflects the customs and other
implied portions of the law of nations.'99 Regardless, the decidedly posi-
tivist nature of the law of nations is now taken for granted.
191. Id. at lxv ("Certain maxims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by
nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law, form the Customary Law
of Nations, or the Custom of Nations. This law is founded upon a tacit consent, or, if you
please, on a tacit convention of the nations that observe it towards each other. Whence it ap-
pears that it is not obligatory except on those nations who have adopted it, and that it is not
universal, any more than the conventional law.").
192. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, at
lxiii n.7 (Joseph Chitty trans., ed., 7th Am. Ed., Philadelphia 1849) (1758).
193. VATTEL, supra note 4, at xiii, 360, 470, 494. Vattel invoked Grotius for the proposi-
tion that the law of nations was a "system established by the common consent of nations," or
universal consent. Id. at v. Vattel also favored another then contemporary definition: the "laws
common to all nations." Id. at viii.
194. James Madison, An Examination of the British Doctrine, Which Subjects to Capture
a Neutral Trade, Not Open in Time of Peace, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 204,208,
238 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
195. See id.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
197. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 267 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
198. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH.
J. INT'L. L. 115, 160-63 (2005); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 449, 450-53 (2000); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Cus-
tomary International Law Game, 99 Am. J. INT'L. L. 541,547-48 (2005).
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B. The Middle Ground
A.J. Bellia and Brad Clark, in their recently published article The
Federal Common Law of Nations, insist that the law of nations is first
and foremost about the relations between sovereign states.'" They argue
the ATS was passed by Congress to "prevent state courts from offending
the law of nations in ways that posed particular threats to the peace of
the United States.,,200 They further demonstrate that historically, courts
"enforced the law of nations in ways that avoided offending the sover-
eign rights of other nations " '20' They present their approach as the middle
ground between the Modernist view that the whole of CIL simply is fed-
eral common law, and the Revisionist view that CIL must first be
affirmatively adopted by the political branches.
In large part, Vattel's writings strongly support this middle ground
approach. Vattel referred to the law of nations as "voluntary" because it
consisted of rules a nation was presumed to have voluntarily adopted
when it became a civilized nation.22 Vattel articulated several fundamen-
tal principles underlying the voluntary law of nations, all of which dealt
with the relations between sovereign states.2 03 To Bellia and Clark's
credit, this author has been unable to find any other scholars who have
recognized the importance of Vattel's notion of the "perfect" rights of
sovereign states to the concept of the law of nations." 4 However, their
article focused on the structural support for their view of the law of na-
tions in the constitutional allocation of powers under Article III. They
did not attempt to catalog which violations of the law of nations should
be recognized by federal courts. 25 Consequently, they had little to say
about the scope of private actions brought under the ATS.
There are three historical questions overlooked by Bellia and Clark
that now need to be addressed in order to make sense of how the law of
nations was employed in the ATS: first, who could seek judicial remedy
for a violation of the law of nations; second, when was a nexus between
a sovereign state's perfect rights and foreign commerce sufficient to trig-
ger a violation of the law of nations; and third, to what extent could
extraterritorial violations of the law of nations be punished? The answers
199. See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 176.
200. Id. at 45.
201. Id. at 62.
202. VATTEL, supra note 4, at lxiv-lxvi.
203. Id. at lxiii-lxv.
204. Bellia & Clark, supra note 176, at 29-30.
205. Id. at 75 ("It is beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue those principles of the
law of nations that the Founders would have deemed essential to upholding the constitutional
allocation of powers."). They also stated that "the historical and structural paradigms we have
identified do not, in and of themselves, definitively resolve all questions confronting courts
today." Id. at 91.
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to these questions potentially challenge Bellia and Clark's conclusion
that the law of nations only involves the perfect rights of sovereign na-
tions.
C. Toward a More Balanced Approach to the Law of Nations
A more balanced approach to the ATS reveals several key aspects
about violations of the present-day law of nations: first, a claim may be
brought by certain persons whose individual rights intersect the perfect
rights of sovereign states. These hybrid cases may include claims involv-
ing no direct state action and/or only economic damages. Second, a
claim may require the exercise of universal jurisdiction in appropriate
cases. Third, a claim not presently recognized in U.S. courts can and
should be advanced through alternative transnational legal processes.
1. Judicial Cognizance of "Hybrid" International Cases
To determine whether a plaintiff has a viable ATS claim, most fed-
eral courts agree they must engage in two distinct analytical inquiries.
First, the court must determine whether it has original subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATS. The ATS, by its terms, confers jurisdiction
when (1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed "in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. ' 2° Second, the court must
determine whether to recognize a common law cause of action to pro-
vide a remedy for the alleged violation of international law.07
The first inquiry concerns federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
held that the ATS is jurisdictional in that it "gave the district courts 'cog-
nizance' of certain causes of action.' 208 This required, among other
things, that courts conduct careful analysis of whether the underlying
conduct is a violation of the present-day law of nations or a treaty of the
United States, which has at least the possibility of a remedy in law. If the
defendant is a private individual or corporation, then the Sosa court
stated in a footnote that "[a] related consideration is whether interna-
tional law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued.
' 2°9
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir.
1995), reh'g denied, 74 F3d 377 (2d. Cir. 1996), remanded to Jane Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93
Civ. 9878, 1996 WL 194298 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996), cert. denied, Karadzic v. Kadic, 518
U.S. 1005 (1996) (discussing the elements of the ATS).
207. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 266 (2d. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
208. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713-14 (2004).
209. Id. at 732 n.20. This implicitly affirms the cognoscibility of ATS claims against
corporate defendants.
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There is no "single, definitive, readily-identifiable source" of the
present-day law of nations.2' Possible sources include all those recog-
nized by Blackstone, Vattel, and the Supreme Court: (1) international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as evi-
denced by a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) the rules of law reflected
in judicial decisions and scholarly legal writings. 2"'
Most of the international law derived from these sources involves
state-to-state relations. 2 The law of nations, as understood at the time of
the passage of the ATS, was founded primarily on state consent, not on
the law of nature. This meant that unless a nation affirmatively agreed to
it, a right or obligation could not be treated as "perfect," or actionable.
By and large, the only international law actually consented to by nations
dealt with relations between states, either express or implied. Early on,
practical issues such as the rights of ambassadors naturally dominated
the content of the law of nations.21' There were, however, certain funda-
mental principles to which all nations could be presumed to have
consented by virtue of their standing as members of the civilized world.
For example, all civilized nations were expected to provide safe passage
for foreign citizens traveling through their territory.14
These perfect or actionable rights dealt not only with foreign rela-
tions, but also with foreign commerce. Both "simultaneously threatened
serious consequences in international affairs.21 5 While nations normally
have "imperfect rights" to external commerce, Vattel claimed that "per-
210. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Flores v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Second Circuit further stated that
"norms of customary international law are 'discerned from myriad decisions made in numer-
ous and varied international and domestic arenas.'" Id. at 176 (citing Flores, 414 F.3d at 247-
48).
211. See Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
116 (2d. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 267 (citations omitted). This
list corresponds to the sources identified by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), to which the United States and all members of the United Nations are parties.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
212. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 176, at 19.
213. See VATTEL, supra note 4, at 488 ("But it is not on account of the sacredness of
their person that ambassadors cannot be sued: it is because they are independent of the juris-
diction of the country to which they are sent."); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES
*247-48 (stating "[t]he rights, the powers, the duties and the privileges of ambassadors are
determined by the law of nature and nations, and not by any municipal constitutions:' and that
ambassadors may be punished for few if any offenses, "however atrocious in [their] nature").
214. See VATTEL, supra note 4, at 417-19; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES
*253.
215. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 173 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715
(2004)).
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fect rights" to foreign commerce can be obtained by conventional
agreements21 -a fact recognized by other well-known writers.21 7 Addi-
tionally, certain disruptions of foreign commerce, such as piracy or
highway robbery, for example, were considered actionable in any juris-
diction, with or without a treaty, because they affected "the common
safety of mankind. 21 8
Once a state's right was perfected, the appropriate response, accord-
ing to Vattel, to a direct violation of that right by another nation was
defensive or offensive war.2"9 Take, for instance, the perfect right of jus-
tice. According to Vattel, "justice is the basis of all society, the sure bond
of all commerce.' 220 Although nations are not to judge one another, as a
general rule, Vattel reasoned that a nation that "despise[s] justice in gen-
eral, is doing an injury to all nations., 22' Thus, other nations had the right
to repress manifest injustice for their own defense and safety. For Vattel,
the authority to declare a just war also permitted other means of compul-
sion to redress, deter, and punish an intentional act of injustice. 2
On the other hand, perfect rights were also violated by the conduct
of private persons. Although not every injustice violated the law of na-
tions, if a nation approved or ratified the act of an individual who
offended the citizen of another country, the matter then became a public223
concern. According to Vattel, the ratifying nation was considered "the
real author of the injury, of which the citizen was perhaps only the in-
strument. 224 This supports the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Sosa
that the drafters of the ATS chiefly had in mind "hybrid" international
216. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 145.
217. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN WOLFF, 2 Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRAC-
TATUM 43-108 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764) (describing how by
agreement nations can obtain "perfect rights" to commerce).
218. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) ("[Piratical murder] is
against all, and punished by all... within this universal jurisdiction.") (quoting VATTEL, supra
note 4, at 229).
219. VATTEL, supra note 4, at xii-lxiv, 160--61; see ROBERT L. HOLMES, Can War Be
Morally Justified? The Just War Theory, in JUST WAR THEORY 197, 201-02, 207-08 (Jean
Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992) (concluding that Vattel was heavily influenced by the just war
tradition that war could be used to enforce international crimes or offenses by states).
220. See VATTEL, supra note 4, at 160.
221. Id. at 161.
222. Vattel explained that "it is not always necessary to have recourse to arms, in order
to punish a nation," id. at 282, and envisioned the use of economic sanctions, id. During a civil
war he also supported assisting the party with "justice on its side." Id. at 156; see J. Andrew
Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 85 TEx. L. REv. 843 (2007) (arguing that because the eighteenth-century law of na-
tions was founded on an analogy between individual persons and states, states-not just
individuals--could be punished for such offenses).
223. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 161.
224. Id.
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cases in which individuals were harmed or injured by the violation of a
perfect right of a state.2
In such cases where the law of nations was indirectly violated, Vattel
maintained that the appropriate response was to seek judicial remedy
before, or in lieu of, declaring war. If the offense took place within its
own territory, the offended state was free to punish the malefactor.16 If
the offense occurred elsewhere, the offending country was expected to
use its judicial system "to compel the transgressor to make reparation for
the damage or injury, if possible, or to inflict on him an exemplary pun-
ishment; .... ,22 The ATS was likely enacted to ensure that the latter was
a viable option in the United States. Failure to provide an opportunity for
reparations would have left the United States "in some measure an ac-
complice in the injury, and ... responsible for it. 28
These conclusions are supported by the three earliest ATS cases.
First, two of the three were brought against non-state actors. 229 This con-
firms that private individuals were subject to the law of nations in the
early years of the United States.3 Second, all three involved economic
rather than physical injuries.23" ' There was nothing particularly shocking
about the underlying facts: no genocide, no torture. 232 The first two in-
stances, Bolchos v. Darrel and O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, involved
essentially commercial matters while the third, Adra v. Clift, amounted
to a child custody battle between two aliens.233 However, in each case the
225. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004); see VATTEL, supra note 4, at
161-62.
226. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 161.
227. Id. at 163.
228. Id. at 162.
229. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (upholding ATS
jurisdiction over an action for the return or restitution of slave property which was on a Span-
ish vessel seized as a prize of war); Adra v. Clift, 195 F Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (upholding
ATS jurisdiction over a child-custody suit between Lebanese nationals because the unlawful
taking of a minor child from the custody of her father was a tort, and the use of a falsified
passport, concealing the child's identity and nationality, and wrongfully transporting the child
across a border violated the law of nations). But see O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S.
45, 51 (1908) (suggesting in passing that the ATS may be applicable to a claim that a U.S.
officer illegally seized alien property in a foreign state).
230. See also Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (dismissing an alien
longshoreman's claim under the ATS because the unseaworthiness of a vessel was not a viola-
tion of the law of nations, but expressly stating that the ATS applied when individuals violated
the law of nations).
231. See cases cited supra note 229.
232. This characterization is not intended to minimize the injustice of slaves being
treated as property in Bolchos; however, the federal district court of South Carolina in that
case arguably employed the ATS to perpetuate the inhumane institution of slavery rather than
combat such gross human rights violations. Bolchos, 3 F Cas. at 811.
233. See cases cited supra note 229. But see Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F3d 767, 774 (6th
Cir. 2007) (suggesting Adra was effectively overruled by Sosa).
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plaintiffs made a good faith argument that the circumstances posed a
potential threat to the law of nations, and the courts agreed.23
2. Use of Universal Jurisdiction
The previous Section suggests that the ATS was likely enacted to
provide aliens with a judicial remedy for violations of the law of nations
occurring here in the U.S. Such a statute was necessary because foreign
courts would have had limited extraterritorial reach over violations oc-
curring here, and an alien's only alternative would have been to have his
own country engage in diplomacy with or declare war against the U.S.
As Vattel put it, nature only gives nations the right to inflict punishment
"for their own defence and safety.
'2 35
However, Vattel also recognized there are occasions when any na-
tion's courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims arising from
extraterritorial violations of the law of nations.236 This so-called universal
jurisdiction was rooted in the idea that certain offenses affect the "com-
mon safety" of all nations.2 " For Vattel, private actors such as pirates,
robbers, poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries fell into this category.238
Nation-states were free to punish even extraterritorial crimes because
their villains "violate[d] all public security, and declare[d] themselves
the enemies of the human race.,
239
Vattel extended the same reasoning to tyrants. He foresaw the pos-
sibility that a sovereign might be such a "monster" that the other
nations of the world would have the right to "exterminate" him.24°
However, Vattel was short on specifics regarding the line between a
nation unjustly treating its own citizens and a nation posing a risk to
the rest of humankind. 24' Some scholars have suggested that it was not
234. Id.
235. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 108.
236. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-60 (1795) (Iredell, J.) (stating
"all ... trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be
proceeded against, in any nation").
237. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 108.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 18 ("We seldom see such monsters as Nero."); id. at 156-57 ("monsters ...
whom every brave man may justly exterminate"); id. at 159 (stating that religious persecution
could rise to the level of "manifest tyranny").
241. Id. at 155-57 (concluding, however, that it was not a violation of the law of nations
for an Incan prince to put his own subjects to death and stating that, "[a]s to those monsters
who, under title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and horror of the human race,
they are savage beasts, whom every brave man may justly exterminate from the face of the
earth").
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until Nuremburg that the world had more concrete examples of when
enough is enough 22
Finally, Vattel envisioned situations in which both public and private
actors are responsible for the same offense. "[W]hen, by its manners,
and by the maxims of its government it accustoms and authorises its citi-
zens indiscriminately to plunder and maltreat foreigners," a nation "in
general is guilty of the crimes of its members. 24 3 Referring to the "Us-
becks" in northern Asia under Genghis Khan, Vattel concluded that the
nation was "guilty of all the robberies committed by the individuals of
which it [was] composed."2"
However, it is difficult to reconcile judicial actions of one nation that
were contrary to the interests of another with the doctrine of sovereign
equality. To compensate, Vattel relied heavily on the notion that universal
jurisdiction requires the consent of all nations on the specifics of each
particular norm.245 Vattel flatly appealed to those rights and obligations
which could be shown empirically to be widely accepted by all na-
tions.24 Since then, the Sosa court has added the requirement that the
empirical evidence not only demonstrate that the norm is universally
accepted but also that it is well-defined. 24 7 Finally, the Second Circuit has
emphasized that these universal, specific norms of the international
community must have evolved "out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern." ' Under these standards, universal jurisdiction has
been used to enforce the law of nations without regard to territoriality.
Courts have moved beyond piracy, safe travel, and ambassador rights to
proscriptions against torture, slave trading, hijacking of aircraft, geno-
cide, and war crimes.
242. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1-16 (1982); Ruth Teitel, Transitional
Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2038
(1997).
243. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 164.
244. Id.
245. Id. at xiii, 360, 469, 494. Some incommensurable rights are still not recognized
under positive law. This is because they are the exception rather than the rule in international
law. Adherence to these moral norms is best achieved through informal, transnational legal
processes.
246. Id. at vi-vii.
247. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
248. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Cir-
cuit has continued to impose this requirement in its post-Sosa decisions. See, e.g., Vietnam
Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 E3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008).
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987).
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3. The Possibility of a Private Remedy at Common Law
Once the court establishes jurisdiction, it must then determine
whether a federal common law tort cause of action is available to pro-
vide a remedy for the alleged violation of international law.5 This
presents an inherent limitation on a federal court's power to remedy the
violation of international norms."' There is no international equivalent to
common tort law; therefore, the use of the phrase "tort only" in the stat-
ute has several implications.
First, it reflects an effort to hold individuals responsible for viola-
tions of the law of nations. As William Blackstone explained, "in vain
would nations in their collective capacity observe these universal rules, if
private subjects were at liberty to break them at their own discretion, and
involve the two states in a war."252 There is considerable historical evi-
dence that the ATS was passed in part because state courts had failed to
hold individuals consistently liable for violating the law of nations.253
In addition, even in the late eighteenth century the term "tort" was
broad enough to encompass both physical and economic torts. At the
time the Judiciary Act was enacted, "torts" included all those civil
wrongs not arising from contract law.5 Furthermore, there is no indica-
tion that Congress intended to distinguish domestic law torts from
international ones.255
Finally, the term "tort" indicates that the international norm only has
to suggest the potential for private remedy. If it does, federal common
law can be used to fill in the gaps, so to speak. As the Sosa court ex-
plained, "[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on
the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action
for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time. 256
250. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 267 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
251. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 729. Under Erie, judicial cognizance under the federal
common law is limited to peculiarly federal interests such as foreign relations and foreign
commerce. Id.
252. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68.
253. See JANIS, supra note 173, at 56 ("[I]t was the inability of the United States under
the Articles of Confederation to live up to its obligations as a sovereign state under interna-
tional law which proved to be one of the principal causes of the downfall of that early form of
US government."); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "De-
fine and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations", 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447,466
(2000).
254. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (relying on Sir Ed-
ward Coke's broad definition of a tort as any "wrong" that is "wrested" or "crooked" and as
simply the "opposite of fight").
255. Id. at 862-63.
256. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
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4. Judicial Caution Rooted in the Sovereignty of Foreign States
Once the two-part substantive analysis is successfully completed,
there are still several procedural safeguards that must be satisfied. These
include the principles of comity, forum non conveniens, the act of state
doctrine25 and the political question doctrine.2 9 These all fall under the
rubric of the Sosa court's oft-repeated exhortation of judicial "caution"
and are rooted in sovereignty concerns.
Today, sovereignty is seldom directly at issue in ATS litigation. In
Filartiga and the first wave of cases filed after that seminal decision, the
defendants were individual government officials and foreign govern-
ments. However, plaintiffs quickly realized that the ATS did not do away
with sovereign immunity for nations and heads of state. 2,0 Even after the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the U.S.
and "foreign states" have continued to be entitled to a presumptive grant
of immunity with certain exceptions.
26
'
In recent years, the focus of ATS litigation has shifted to corporate
defendants in an effort to avoid the difficulties of sovereign immunity.
However, this has only shifted the debate to more complex questions,
such as the extent to which private individuals and corporations may be
protected under the FSIA as an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the
state.
As the Second Circuit noted, the five factors listed by the Sosa court
do not require point-by-point application and analysis.262 However, these
five factors still pose a "high bar to new private causes of action" under
the ATS.263 In particular, the requirements that an ATS claim must be ac-
cepted by the civilized world and defined with a sufficient degree of
specificity severely limit the number of viable claims.26"
In fact, the threshold requirement that a complaint be sufficient on
its face to state a claim for relief may pose the greatest obstacle to future
257. See Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127-28 (D. Colo.
2004).
258. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
259. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
260. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See generally Aron Ketchel, Note, Deriving
Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims Act from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 32 YALE J.
INT'L L. 191, 193-94 (2007).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2008) (FSIA exceptions); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2008) (FTCA ex-
ceptions).
262. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F3d 254, 268 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
263. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
264. Id.
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ATS litigation. In 2007, the Supreme Court announced the plausibility
standard for pleadings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.26 According to
the Twombly court, a complaint must go beyond reciting the elements of
a cause of action.2 6 In 2009, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal con-
firmed the general applicability of that standard and made clear any
conclusory statements in the complaint are to be disregarded.267 Indeed,
the Eleventh Circuit in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, recently dismissed an
ATS case in part because the plaintiff could not meet the Twombly/lqbal
standard.268
Additionally, the fundamental principle of separation of powers re-
quires courts to make sure that an ATS case does not interfere with U.S.
foreign policy. The Sosa court suggested that principles of exhaustion
might apply under certain circumstances269 agreeing with the European
Commission that "basic principles of international law require that be-
fore asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have
exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and per-
haps in other fora such as international claims tribunals. 270
Moreover, federal courts must still have personal jurisdiction over
the defendants, not just the subject matter jurisdiction granted by the
ATS. 27' For example, the $15.5 million settlement in Wiwa v. Shell
Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria was reached only after the Ninth
Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of
265. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
266. Id. at 555-56.
267. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
268. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 578 F3d 1252, 1266 (11 th Cir. 2009); see also Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal of an ATS
suit alleging death threats, mental torture, house arrest, and surveillance because the plaintiff's
conclusory statements "fail[ed] to provide adequate factual specificity as to what happened to
him individually"). Although beyond the scope of this Article, this tougher threshold standard
(and its resulting foreclosure on discovery) will have a disparate impact on international civil
litigation for a number of reasons. The geographic distance between foreign parties, as well as
the disparity in economic and political power between private plaintiffs and TNCs with their
sovereign bedfellows make it more difficult for ATS plaintiffs to have access to the necessary
evidence during the initial stages of litigation. Not unlike civil rights or employment cases,
there is seldom a "smoking gun" document admitting complicity or intent in human rights
cases. Therefore, most ATS cases must be built on circumstantial evidence about which a
reasonable jury could disagree. The fact that such evidence must be painstakingly pieced to-
gether through costly discovery does not lessen, or in most cases outweigh, its probative value.
269. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
270. Id.
271. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, Royal Dutch Petroleum Col. v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (applying New York per-
sonal jurisdiction law to a corporate defendant in an ATS case).
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personal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff had adequately
alleged the defendant's minimum contacts with the United States.272
5. Incommensurable Rights and the Transnational Legal Process
The ATS was arguably drafted broadly enough by the first Congress
to provide federal courts with the legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction
to uphold nearly any inalienable right violated in an international dis-
pute. If justice is a perfect right, for example, then the failure of the
judicial branch to rise to such occasions would not only damage its repu-
tation and relations with allied nations, but it would do inexcusable harm
to the fundamental international principle of justice itself. 7 ' Admittedly
this would involve courts in the task of looking to the "necessary" (natu-
ral) law of nations for guidance, but only because there is presumably no
other choice in these brief moments in time when the positive law is
found to be wholly unsatisfactory. 4
Alternatively, Vattel can be read more conservatively to say that the
only legitimate way to remedy imperfect international rights, even inc-
ommensurable rights, is to ask other nations to comply or otherwise
complain. By complain, Vattel meant to make an "officious and amicable
representation" or to lawfully "intercede" without the threat of physical
force.275 For Vattel, the goal of such efforts was to reach an agreement or
consensus that could then be reflected in international law as a perfect
right (at least between the parties to that agreement). In this context,
moral arguments are presumably necessary and useful to the interna-
tional law "perfecting" process. Once physical force is off the table,
moral force can be allowed to speak. Even then, though, stakeholders
must speak a common language; accordingly, most participants today
use secular reasoning and avoid, for the most part, making reference to
the sacred or holy.
276
272. Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria, No. 08-1803-CV, 2009 WL
1560197, at *1-2 (2d Cir. June 3, 2009).
273. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *61. Blackstone argued that "since
in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary that, when the general de-
crees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power
vested of excepting those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself
would have excepted." Id.
274. This theory would be the international equivalent of Sterling Professor of Law
Bruce Ackerman's account of the constitutional history of the United States as a series of
failed constitutional moments that led to support for large transformative ambitions such as
the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the New Deal. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: VOL. 1, FOUNDATIONS 41-42 (1991).
275. VATTEL, supra note 4, at 155, 159.
276. This may reflect the death of moral philosophy. On the other hand, it may simply be
a carryover of the prejudices and protocols of the old regulatory model. Additionally, many of
the participants in these new joint public-private sector efforts to develop international stan-
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During the early years of the United States there was considerable
use of international arbitration to resolve disputes . 7 In today's interna-
tional arena, this public discourse roughly equates to the preliminary
stages of what several scholars call the "transnational legal process.'278
This process was perhaps best summarized by Professor Koh:
[K]ey agents in promoting this process of internalization include
transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental norm sponsors,
transnational issue networks, and interpretive communities. In
this story, one of these agents triggers an interaction at the inter-
national level, works together with other agents of
internalization to force an interpretation of the international legal
norm in an interpretive forum, and then continues to work with
those agents to persuade a resisting nation-state to internalize
that interpretation into domestic law. Through repeated cycles of
"interaction-interpretation-internalization," particular readings of
applicable global norms are eventually domesticated into states'
internal legal systems.279
Once agreement is achieved through the varied transnational legal proc-
ess, then U.S. courts can begin the arduous task of recognizing the
international norm as part of the federal common law.
In the interim, however, U.S. courts can do more than wait for CIL
to develop. Just as federal courts have increasingly turned to alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve domestic litigation, particularly em-
ployment litigation, they should aggressively employ a similar
mechanism for international disputes implicating incommensurable
rights. In reality, this is probably already happening and would explain
why most ATS cases have settled before going to trial.8
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ATS TO FOREIGN BRIBERY
Using the above legal framework, an ATS claim against transnational
corporations (TNCs) may be predicated on their bribery of foreign
dards still wear more than one hat. In these last two instances, it may simply be a matter of old
dogs learning new tricks.
277. See JANIS, supra note 173, at 135 (noting the 536 awards of the Jay Treaty arbitra-
tions between 1777 and 1804).
278. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 168, at 567-68.
279. Id.
280. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dismissing after the case settled out
of court shortly before trial).
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government officials. This conclusion is based on several assumptions.
First, TNCs are subject to at least some legal obligations under the ATS.
For several years, the basic notion of holding legal entities criminally
liable generated considerable debate.28' This controversy culminated in
the failed attempt to introduce criminal liability of corporations in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.282 Since then, however,
signatories to several international conventions have adopted the concept
of corporate criminal liability.283 Furthermore, all (or nearly all) jurisdic-
tions impose civil liability on TNCs in one form or another. Therefore,
since the ATS merely authorizes federal courts to hear civil actions in
"tort only'" most courts and scholars agree that ATS suits may be brought
against TNCs. Even if that were not the case, individual liability of cor-
porate officers and management is not strongly debated and can be
almost equally effective.
Second, civil liability of TNCs for violating the law of nations under
the ATS is achieved by courts applying domestic tort law. Again, there is
considerable debate in the literature over the interplay between the stat-
ute's phrases "tort only" and "a violation of the law of nations or a
treaty." However, the international norm against foreign bribery holds
TNCs accountable by both criminal prosecution and private civil actions.
Civil actions are universally accomplished using domestic laws, includ-
ing the common law of tort. Therefore, as demonstrated below, a private
tort action against a TNC for engaging in foreign bribery is squarely
within the scope of CIL.
Finally, for purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the ATS does
not extend liability for foreign bribery to foreign governments or their
officials directly-an extension unsuccessfully attempted by the plain-
tiffs in RSM Productions v. Fridman.2 4 In a majority of circuits, any
adverse governmental action taken by an official because of a bribe is
deemed within his or her official capacity for purposes of immunity un-
der the FSIA and not amendable to suit.285 The plaintiffs in RSM
281. See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Hu-
man Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 49, 64-67 (2002).
282. See Bert Swart, Discussion: International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form
of Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 947, 948 (2008).
283. Id.
284. See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y 2009).
285. Id. at 395, n.8 (citing In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d
Cir. 2008), Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 E3d 380, 388 (5th
Cir. 1999), Keller v. Centr. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), Chuidian v. Phil-
ippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990), and Junqquist v. Sheikh Sulton
Bin Khaflifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997) for the majority rule that the
immunity granted by the FSIA "extends to individual governmental officials for acts taken in
their official capacity").
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Productions argued that under U.S. precedent, a Grenadian official's re-
ceipt of bribes violated international law. 86 While this Article argues that
is true,287 the Supreme Court also made clear in Amerada Hess II that the
FSIA provides the sole basis for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign state.28 Therefore, according to both a majority of circuit courts
and the Southern District of New York, where individual government
officials are treated as instrumentalities of the state, foreign officials
cannot be held liable in their official capacity.
2 89
A. Application by Lower Federal Courts
A number of lower federal court decisions have seemingly con-
cluded foreign bribery is not cognizable under the ATS. However, these
cases largely beg the question and leave undone the sort of comprehen-
sive analysis of CIL advocated by the Supreme Court. A summary of
these decisions is set forth below.
2901. IITv. Vencap
The first appellate court to come close to addressing the foreign
bribery issue was the Second Circuit in liT v. Vencap in 1973. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that ordinary corporate fraud was not a violation of
international norms, and was therefore not a cognizable tort under the
ATS.291
liT does not definitively exclude economic torts from the scope of
the ATS for several reasons. First, it predated the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Sosa-a decision that signaled a return to the original scope of the
law of nations which included purely commercial, non-shocking of-
fenses. Second, global commerce has dramatically changed since HT
was decided. Third, and perhaps most importantly, HT did not involve
allegations of foreign bribery; unlike general corporate fraud, foreign
286. Id. at 391.
287. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (case attempting to establish vicarious liability under
the ATCA of various individual and corporate defendants for actions taken by the State of
Nigeria). But see RSM Prod. at 391 n. 12 ("Plaintiffs have not even alleged that [one defen-
dant] violated the law of nations, nor could they have under the formulation as revised under
Sosa and Abdullahi*").
288. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
289. But see Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Pro-
posed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77
CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989) (arguing that courts should deny sovereign immunity when a state's
violation of jus cogens injures an individual).
290. See HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
291. See id. at 1015. In fact, the Second Circuit later distinguished the underlying claims
in ]IT when finding allegations of torture actionable under the ATS in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
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bribery directly implicates foreign government officials and therefore
more closely reflects the sort of perfect rights arising from state-to-state
relations that the law of nations protects.
2. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse
292
The only other appellate court to address a claim under the ATS
predicated on purely commercial conduct, including bribery, was the
Ninth Circuit in Hamid v. Price Waterhouse. The Hamid opinion arose
from claims by depositors in the Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna-
tional that seventy-seven named defendants had committed corporate
fraud and misused funds to finance international terrorism, narcotics traf-
ficking, arms dealing, bribery of government officials, and approval of
loans to bank insiders with no intent to seek repayment.29 ' The plaintiffs
claimed that these activities violated the law of nations, thereby confer-
ring jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS.294 Although the defendants'
conduct was international in scope, the Ninth Circuit held that "fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds [including brib-
ing bank regulators] are not appropriately considered breaches of the
'law of nations."' 295 Rather, agreeing with the Second Circuit's opinion in
HT, the Ninth Circuit deemed these activities to be "garden variety viola-
tions of statutes, banking regulations, and common law.' 296 Furthermore,
the appellate court found the plaintiffs' complaint failed to meet the
"stringent" requirement that the defendants' conduct violate rules com-
manding the "general assent of civilized nations. 297
However, the case did not reflect any consideration whatsoever of
the possibility that the bribery of foreign officials itself violated interna-
tional law, which suggests that it should not control. 298 The Sosa opinion
emphasized the importance of a more thorough, nuanced review of evi-
dence of CIL in determining whether short-term arbitrary detention
constituted a violation of the law of nations.29 Since the Ninth Circuit's
Hamid decision, the Second Circuit has relied on the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention to find that aiding and abetting is a violation of CIL
292. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
293. Id. at 1414.
294. Id. at 1417.
295. Id. at 1418.
296. Id.
297. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).
298. Id. The court summarily concluded that "[blecause appellants' claims of fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds are not appropriately considered
breaches of the 'law of nations' for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute,
Count IV was properly dismissed." Id.
299. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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and thus actionable under the ATS.3°° The Ninth Circuit in Hamid should
have conducted a similar analysis of the probative value of all the exist-
ing anti-bribery conventions in support of foreign bribery, and hopefully
will do so in a future case.
3. Several District Court Decisions
A few district courts have also had the opportunity to consider
whether allegations of bribery are sufficient to state a claim under the
ATS. The earliest such case was Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc. ' The
plaintiff Mendonca was a foreign employee who alleged he was forced
by his employer to pay bribes to help the employer avoid taxes in his
native country. Although it did not identify which treaties were cited by
the plaintiff, the district court found that the plaintiff had failed to pro-
vide "solid support for his claim that the conduct complained of [rose] to
the level recognized by the law of nations."30 2 In any event, the plaintiff
was unlikely to have been able to satisfy the court, which asserted that
the ATS applies "only to shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law."303 As discussed in Part
V(D)(1), this "shocking-only" standard is inappropriate post-Sosa.
In January 2004, a federal district court in Colorado in Maugein v.
Newmont Mining Corp. rejected an ATS claim brought by plaintiff Pat-
rick Maugein based on allegations that the defendant mine owners had
bribed Peruvian judges to rule in their favor in a legal dispute over min-
ing assets in Peru. 3°" In support of his claim that the defendants' conduct
violated the law of nations, Maugein cited the OECD Convention as well
as the OAS Convention Against Corruption.305 The judge admitted that
"[c]ourts have reached differing conclusions as to the requirements for a
treaty to provide a private remedy in tort ' '° but found it did not have "to
clear a path through this thicket 3 7 to decide Maugein's claim because
the alleged bribes were not the proximate cause of his claimed injuries.
Interestingly, Maugein was not a party to the underlying lawsuit filed
in Peru but was rather a consultant working on contingency for the los-
ing parties.3 0 Ironically, the defendants had attempted early on to
300. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
301. Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D. La. 2001).
302. Id. at 302.
303. Id. (quoting Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 E3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999)).
304. See Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2004).
305. Id. at 1130.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1126-27.
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discredit Maugein by accusing him of bribery and extortion.309 After the
Peruvian court's decision was finalized in Peru, Maugein unsurprisingly
urged the losing parties to bring charges before the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the defen-
dants had corrupted the Peruvian judicial system."0 When the ICSID
dispute was finally settled, the parties expressly agreed in their settle-
ment agreement not to assist or support Maugein in any of his potential
claims.3 ' Nevertheless, the defendants continued their efforts to discredit
Maugein in a Peruvian magazine article and in a book distributed in the
United States telling their side of the story continued after the ICSID
settlement.1 2 Based on these facts, the federal court concluded
Maugein's "economic interests, however characterized, were not the tar-
get of that [bribery] conduct."'31 3 Moreover, the district court ruled that
defamation that does not involve the bribery of foreign officials is not a
violation of the law of nations.34 Nothing in the Maugein decision, there-
fore, contradicts the notion that bribery of a foreign official causing an
alien to be injured, economically or otherwise, is actionable under the
ATS.
Since Sosa, the lower courts' handling of bribery-based ATS claims
has continued to be unpredictable. In late 2004, the district court for the
Eastern District of New York held in Arndt v. Union Bank of Switzerland
that German citizens could not bring a claim under the ATS against the
successor of a German corporation that allegedly profited during the
Nazi regime and failed to turn over assets belonging to the Holocaust
victims.
315
In 2008, in Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., the
same Eastern District of New York district court considered evidence of
bribery in support of a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the
ATS. 16 Initially, the court appeared open to the possibility that evidence
that the defendant had bribed the Bangladeshi police to arrest and torture
the plaintiff "[might] be actionable under the [ATS]" as aiding and abet-
ting. However, the court quickly concluded the plaintiff in that particular
309. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F Supp. 2d 1124, 1127 (D. Colo. 2004).
310. Id.
311. Id. (specifically Normandy Mining Ltd. expressly agreed not to assist or support
Maugein in any of his claims).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1130.
314. Id. at 1129-30.
315. See Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that corporate
fraud is not cognizable under the ATS).
316. Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375, 385-87
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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case did not satisfy the Twombly plausibility standard. 17 The court then
attempted to foreclose on even the theoretical possibility of an aiding
and abetting action based on bribery by insisting that the ATS requires
not only state action but that the action be taken pursuant to a state pol-
icy. The court suggested that the ATS does not extend to situations in
which the Bangladeshi police were aiding and abetting defendants who
wanted to usurp a business opportunity. In a bit of twisted logic the court
explained:
A private party can corruptly enlist state resources to accomplish
his own ends, and if the means that the private party uses to
make his agent, the state, accomplish that goal is the knowing
violation of an international law norm, he should be liable as a
principal for the violation. But that makes defendants principals,
not aiders and abetters.318
Construing the ATS so narrowly as to require action pursuant to a
state policy (other than mere acquiescence to a private party's unlawful
agenda) is completely contrary to the original understanding of a viola-
tion of the law of nations at the time of the passage of the ATS.
In early 2009, a far better analysis of an ATS claim predicated on
bribery was provided by the Southern District of New York in RSM Pro-
r 319
duction Corp. v. Fridman. In that case, the district court could have
been convinced that foreign bribery is actionable under the ATS as a vio-
lation of tacit or conventional international law.32° It questioned whether
"an international instrument that ha[d] been ratified by only 37 countries
sufficiently demonstrate[d] that bribery of a foreign public official is a
'violation of international law' within the meaning of the [ATS]. '32' Rec-
ognizing that it did not have sufficient data to determine whether there
was a custom prohibiting bribery, the court surmised that the plaintiffs
could not have shown that the defendant had violated the law of nations
because the defendant was the bribe-taker, not the bribe giver.322 In doing
so, the court left open the possibility that private individuals and corpo-
rate defendants who make questionable payments to such officials may
be in violation of the law of nations.
317. Id. at 386; Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
318. Chowdhury, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
319. See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 398.
322. Id.
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B. Application as a Violation of the Conventional Law of Nations
In light of the foregoing case law, the adoption or execution of a
treaty prohibiting foreign bribery may provide the best evidence that a
prohibition of bribery is part of the law of nations-at least if enough
nations are party to the treaty.323 Nevertheless, when a convention or
treaty is sufficient, in and of itself, to provide a remedy under the ATS isa compex • 124
a complex question. Further, some courts appear to draw a distinction
between those treaties that are self-executing and those that require im-
plementing domestic legislation, while other courts have held that
limiting the inquiry to either narrow category is inappropriate.325 Some
courts demand that international civil law give rise to the tort, while oth-
ers find criminal codes equally convincing if they lend themselves to at
least the possibility of a private civil remedy. Finally, some courts recog-
nize that general norms apply to all potential defendants, while others
require that the international law target particular types of defendants
(for example, TNCs). These issues are explored below in the context of
foreign bribery.
1. A Universal and Specific Criminal Offense
As mentioned earlier, there are no less than seven international anti-
bribery conventions criminalizing foreign bribery, each signed and/or
ratified by a number of countries. The OAS Convention has thirty-three
signatories.326 All thirty members of the OECD plus eight other countries
323. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 283-84 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). But see Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that a formal treaty is not the "lone pri-
mary source" of an international norm).
324. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). As discussed ear-
lier, the definition of Vattel's conventional law of nations overlaps considerably with the
notion of "treaties," which is also expressly invoked in the ATS. Here the terms are used inter-
changeably.
325. Compare Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362
(D.N.J. 1998), with Abdullahi, 562 E3d at 176; see also Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F.
Supp. 2d 1080, 1090-91 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that an international agreement that has
not been executed by the United States may provide some evidence of CIL, and thus support
imposition of liability under the ATS, even if the agreement does not directly provide a
cause of action). There is language in Sosa supporting both sides. Compare Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (reaffirming Filartiga, which relied on
non-self-executing agreements as evidence of CIL), with Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734-35 (rejecting
the argument that non-ratified treaties and non-approved conventions create enforceable obli-
gations in federal courts).
326. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2009, at 334
(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123747.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
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signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, including all G7 countries. 7
The European Union's Criminal Law Convention on Corruption has
forty-nine signatories,"' which is only slightly more than the forty-two
signatories to its Civil Law Convention on Corruption.3 29 No fewer than
forty-six member states have joined the related Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO), which focuses on capacity building.30 Twenty-
eight countries have endorsed the ABD/OECD Action Plan.33' The efforts
of the forty-four signatories to the A.U. Convention 32 to combat
corruption through international law have also been the focus of com-
parative law scholars.3  Finally, the most recent and largely subscribed
of the international anti-bribery conventions is the UNCAC, with 140
signatories to date.3
The OECD Convention is one of the oldest and perhaps the most
widely regarded of these agreements. It requires its signatories to crimi-
nalize the bribery of foreign public officials and to impose criminal
penalties on those who give, offer, or promise any such bribes under
their national laws-which all thirty-eight signatories have done.335
These countries provide more than two-thirds of the world's exports.336
As the first legally binding international convention on bribery, the
UNCAC took anti-bribery efforts a step further by setting forth a frame-
work for international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting
cross-border cases. Article 38 of the UNCAC states: "Each State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accor-
dance with its domestic law, cooperation between, on the one hand, its
327. See OECD: Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.oecd.org/document/21/ 0,3343,
en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_l,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
328. See Council of Europe: Chart of Renewal of Declarations or Reservations, Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmlI173-1.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
329. See Civil Law Convention on Corruption, opened for signature, Nov. 4, 1999, Eu-
rop. T.S. No. 174.
330. U.S. DEr. oF STATE, supra note 326, at 335.
331. See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, Member Coun-
tries and Economies, http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_34982156_35315367_
35030743_1 1ll,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
332. See List of Countries that Have Signed the African Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/List/African
%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
333. See generally Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 691 (2007).
334. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Signatories to the U.N. Convention Against Cor-
ruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2010).
335. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions art. l(1), Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 37
I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
336. Id.
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public authorities, as well as its public officials, and, on the other hand,
its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal of-
fences."337
Not only is there an amazing congruence between these various
agreements over the definition of the conduct prohibited, but the terms
are set out with a great deal of specificity as well. 38 For example, the
UNCAC criminalizes both active and passive bribery of foreign offi-
cials.339 These international conventions target private wrongdoers as
well as state actors; in fact, most of the existing agreements explicitly
focus on the bribe-givers rather than the bribe-takers, 340 which evidences
a universal intent to hold private individuals and corporations liable.
2. With the Possibility of a Private Civil Remedy
Although they lack express mandates for civil remedies, interna-
tional agreements to criminalize bribery arguably evidence an
international norm supporting a cause of action under the ATS. The Su-
preme Court in Sosa admitted that even Blackstone's three paradigmatic
violations of the law of nations were derived from criminal codes exist-
ing in the late eighteenth century.14 In his majority opinion, Justice
Souter assumed that both civil and criminal liability was well established
for the Blackstonian offenses in the early United States. However, Jus-
tice Souter's quotations from Vattel do not ascribe the same level of
specificity for the civil remedy as they do for the criminal offense. In
fact, these historical citations suggest the criminal law against piracy and
the other Blackstonian offenses did most of the work in establishing
these offenses as a violation of the law of nations. Yet, this did not pre-
clude Justice Souter from concluding that a private civil action in tort
may be brought for these mostly criminal violations. In the end, Sosa can
be fairly read to say the present-day law of nations need only provide for
the "possibility" of a civil remedy.
31 2
337. UNCAC, supra note 145, art. 38 (emphasizing the importance of robust
"[c]ooperation between national authorities").
338. Unlike the FCPA, the UNCAC does not explicitly provide an exception for facilitat-
ing payments. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 118 (2005). However, the Commentaries of the OECD Conven-
tion do carve out an exception for small facilitating payments. Id. at 391. Likewise, the
Juridical Committee Report accompanying the OAS Convention implies that party states may
be able to exclude facilitating payments from their implementing legislation. Id. at 103.
339. UNCAC, supra note 145, art. 15 (requiring criminalization of both).
340. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 144, art. 1 (containing the typical language making it
unlawful to "offer, promise or give" anything of value to a foreign public official).
341. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
342. See id. at 714.
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International agreements other than the OECD Convention confirm
the possibility of a civil remedy. The UNCAC, for example, mandates
that nations provide a private cause of action for the victims of foreign
bribery.34' Subtitled "Compensation for Damage," Article 35 of the
UNCAC states:
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary,
in accordance with the principles of its domestic law, to ensure
that entities or persons who have suffered damages as a result of
an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain
compensation."3
Although Article 35 is cast in mandatory language, the travaux pre-
paratoires state that "[w]hile article 35 does not restrict the right of each
State Party to determine the circumstances under which it will make its
courts available in such cases, it is also not intended to require or en-
dorse the particular choice made by a State Party in doing so.' '34 Thus,
according to an implementation guide prepared by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "[t]his does not require that vic-
tims should be guaranteed compensation or restitution, but legislative or
other measures must provide procedures whereby it can be sought or
claimed."34 The official position of the United States is that its existing
laws satisfy the Article 35 mandate for private remedies.47
In addition to making foreign bribery a criminal and civil offense,
Article 33 of the UNCAC requires states to consider enacting
343. UNCAC, supra note 145, art. 35.
344. Id.
345. Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, Report
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption on the
Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions: Addendum, 38, U.N. Doc. A/58/422/Add. 1 (Oct. 7,
2003); see also Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l Law, Recommenda-
tion 10-11 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/crimeextradition/
conventioncorruption08_05.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
346. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 147, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.IV.16 (2006). As another U.N. publication explained, "when SMEs suffer financial or
other economic damage as a result of acts of corruption, measures need to be taken [by signa-
tories] to ensure that they have the fight to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible
for that damage in order to obtain compensation." U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG. & U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, 1 CORRUPTION PREVENTION TO FOSTER SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 20 (2007), available at http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/
usermedia/Services/PSD/CSR/UNIDOUNODCPublication_on_Small_BusinessDevelopm
ent and Corruption.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
347. See Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, supra
note 312, 38 (stating that a country is free to "determine the circumstances under which it
will make its courts available in such cases").
Michigan Journal of International Law
whistleblower protection "against any unjustified treatment for any per-
son who reports ... any facts concerning [acts of corruption]," further
empowering private attorneys general." Article 34 enables nations to
"consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or
rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or other similar instrument or
take any other remedial action."349 Finally, Article 37 is available to en-
courage reporting of corrupt activities by requiring nations to consider
"granting immunity from prosecution" in cases of self-incrimination. °
Since it went into effect, the UNCAC has become the standard by which
most countries and watchdog groups evaluate deficiencies in anti-
corruption efforts.35" '
Although none of the other anti-corruption instruments explicitly
mandate a private right of action, they all acknowledge the importance of
involving private parties in the fight against corruption and provide for
specific measures to that end. For example, the A.U. Corruption Conven-
tion states that "State Parties undertake to ... establish mechanisms to
encourage participation by the private sector in the fight against unfair
competition, respect for the tender procedures and property rights. 3 2
Therefore, international law both prohibits foreign bribery and supports
its private redress.
348. UNCAC, supra note 145, art. 33.
349. Id. art. 34.
350. Id. art. 37.
351. See CORRUPTION ERADICATION COMM'N, REP. OF INDON., IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS
BETWEEN LAws/REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (2006), available at http://www.u4.no/themes/uncac/
documents/UNCAC-Gap-Analysis-Indonesia.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009); LILIAN EKEAN-
YANWU, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, NIG., REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO
THE DOMESTICATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS IN NIGERIA (2006), available
at www.transparency.org/content/download/18024/244083 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009);
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ), A COMPARISON OF
COMPLIANCE REVIEWS BASED ON THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: INDONESIA,
COLOMBIA, CAMEROON AND GERMANY (2007), available at http://www.igac.net/pdf/
publications.gtzcompliance.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (study commissioned by the Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development); ROVSHAN ISMAYILOV, SUPPORT
TO THE ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY OF AZERBAIJAN (AZPAC), TECHNICAL PAPER ON LEVEL OF
COMPLIANCE OF THE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN WITH INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS (2008), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/
economiccrime/corruption/projects/azpac951-AZPAC-TP-64-Rovshanlsmayilov.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010); PHILIP KICHANA, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, KENYA, COUNTRY REVIEW OF LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO THE DOMESTICATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS
(2006), available at www.transparency.org/content/download/18021/244074 (last visited Feb. 5,
2010).
352. A.U. Convention, supra note 143, art. 11(2).
[Vol. 31:385
Winter 2010] Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution
C. Application as a Violation of the Customary Law of Nations
Alternatively, these anti-bribery conventions constitute evidence that
foreign bribery violates the customary law of nations. The customary
law of nations is derived from the "customs and usages of civilized na-
tions" and the broad acceptance of any emerging norm by the
international community.353 The Second Circuit in Abdullahi held that
"even declarations of international norms that are not in and of them-
selves binding may, with time and in conjunction with state practice,
provide evidence that a norm has developed the specificity, universality,
and obligatory nature required for ATS jurisdiction.""
This "tacit" CIL may include domestic laws implementing non-self-
executing treaties as well as the myriad of decisions made by both inter-
national and domestic tribunals."' The Second Circuit in Khulumani
concluded CIL could be established by showing a pattern and practice of
nations using domestic laws to remedy bribery-induced injuries.356
The enactment of the FCPA in the United States, as well as similar
legislation by numerous signatories to the international conventions (in-
cluding major trading partners of the United States, such as the European
Union, Australia, and Japan) clearly establish that nations have acted
independently to outlaw foreign bribery. In fact, when Congress
amended the FCPA in 1998 to conform with the OECD Convention's
requirement that states provide nationality jurisdiction over U.S. persons
or firms who pay bribes in wholly foreign transactions, the Senate ex-
pressly relied on the "law of nations clause" as authorization for passing
the FCPA."7
D. Application as a Violation of the Universal Voluntary
Law of Nations
Not only does foreign bribery violate the law of nations, it also im-
plicates certain fundamental norms that merit peremptory authority over
any bribe-giver. There is still considerable debate regarding the use of
universal jurisdiction to hold corporations liable for violating the law of
353. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
354. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
Abdullahi court also stated that agreements "that have not been executed by federal legislation
... are appropriately considered evidence of the current state of customary international law."
Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
355. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) ("[W]here there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations.") (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
356. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
357. S. REP. No. 105-277, at 3 (1998).
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nations. Some courts maintain that a claim must involve the most egre-
gious and shocking jus cogens offenses in order to show that the acts
were violations of the law of nations.5 Other courts are willing to relax
this standard, but only for claimants who can show joint state action or
"official complicity. '359 Still others insist that if there is too much state
action, courts should refuse to hear the case on grounds of the political
question doctrine. 36° All three points of this potentially fatal Bermuda
triangle for ATS cases, and their impact on suits predicated on foreign
bribery, are discussed below.
1. Jus Cogens Under the Mutual Concern Standard
Post-Sosa, U.S. courts have been gradually refining the list of viola-
tions of the law of nations that attach to non-state actors in the absence
of any connection to state action. The California federal district court in
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., for example, determined that a corporation could
be held independently liable as a private actor under the ATS for certain
offenses.3 6' According to Kadic v. Karadzic, even isolated cases of rape,
torture, and summary execution "are actionable under the [ATS], without
regard to state action, to the extent they are committed in pursuit of
genocide or war crimes. 3 62 Recent rulings have added slave trading,
358. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F3d 932, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g en
banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a private party could be liable only forjus cogens offenses
including torture, murder, slavery, and rape as a form of torture without a showing of state
action); see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F Supp. 2d 289,
306 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the relationship between jus cogens norms and the
ATCA).
359. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The 'color of law' juris-
prudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in
official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATS]"); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (finding
liability based on a substantial amount of cooperation between Shell and the Nigerian gov-
ernment); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F Supp. 2d 259, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd in part on
other grounds Tachiona v. U.S., 386 F3d 205 (holding a political party liable for torture and
terror because it acted in concert with government officials and used government resources).
360. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2006) (granting summary
judgment for defendant and stating that "the more plaintiffs assert official complicity in the
acts of which they complain, the closer they sail to the jurisdictional limitation of the political
question doctrine").
361. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 395 F3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g granted, 395 F3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), dismissed, 403 F3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dismissing after it was settled out of
court shortly before trial).
362. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F3d 377
(2d. Cir. 1996), remanded to Jane Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 9878, 1996 WL 194298
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1996), cert. denied, Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
[Vol. 31:385
Winter 2010] Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution
slavery, and forced labor to that list.363 Thus, an alien can presently sue a
corporation in tort under the ATS with regard to any of these so-called
jus cogens offenses, which literally translated means "compelling law."
However, jus cogens has created a normative hierarchy that has led
courts to read the ATS too narrowly. For example, courts in the Fifth
Circuit3' 6 and Second Circuit3 65 have attempted to limit ATS to claims
based on only the most shocking violations of the law of nations. 366 This
is improper because ajus cogens violation satisfies, but is not required to
meet, the requirements of the ATS.367 Therefore, as I have argued thus far
in the article, foreign bribery should be cognizable under the ATS,
whether or not the norm is jus cogens.368
Alternatively, there are compelling arguments for expanding the
scope of jus cogens. Professors Criddle and Fox-Decent, for example,
recently set forth a fiduciary theory that may give other fundamental
norms peremptory authority.3 69 Although application of their theory to
foreign bribery is beyond the scope of this Article, I would argue that
there is no principled basis upon which to exclude foreign bribery from
the list of jus cogens offenses. On the contrary, foreign bribery impli-
cates fundamental norms necessary for foreign relations and trade that
merit its treatment as jus cogens. The most appropriate test for jus co-
gens is whether the transgressions are of "mutual" concern. Generally,
this standard is satisfied in cases "involving States' actions performed
... towards or with regard to the other."3 70 However, state action is not
always necessary. The standard is also met where "nations of the world
have demonstrated 'by means of express international accords' that the
wrong is of mutual concern."37' According to the Second Circuit, an im-
portant component of this test is "showing that the conduct in question is
363. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
364. See Fazer v. Chi. Bridge & Iron, 2006 WL 801208, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Men-
donca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (E.D. La. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
365. See Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 E Supp. 2d 510, 523
(S.D.N.Y 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F Supp. 2d 534, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
366. But see Doe v. Unocal, 395 F3d 932, 945 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining jus cogens
as simply norms that are binding on all nations).
367. Id. at 945, n. 15.
368. See Slawotsky, supra note 23, at 150.
369. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INT'L L. 331, 347-48 (2009).
370. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Flores v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003)). This corresponds to the "perfect" or action-
able rights of sovereign states.
371. Id. at 185.
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'capable of impairing international peace and security.' ,172 The prohibi-
tion against foreign bribery satisfies both of these requirements.
The entry of over 180 nation states, in toto, into international agree-
ments in over the last decade, and the subsequent passage by most of
implementing domestic legislation, demonstrate that the world has acted
in concert to outlaw bribery of government officials. As discussed ear-
lier, they not only criminalize such conduct, they mandate civil remedies.
In other words, acting out of a sense of mutual concern, "'the nations [of
the world] have made it their business, both through international ac-
cords and unilateral action,' to demonstrate their intention to eliminate"
foreign bribery.3 73 Given this overwhelming evidence of international
efforts to combat foreign bribery the offense should be included in the
definition of jus cogens as a matter of mutual concern.
Moreover, foreign bribery poses a real threat to international peace
and security. First, it can have a devastating effect on poor nations. Ex-
perts recognize the importance of globalization to poor nations and their
ability to provide a decent standard of living for their populations. Glob-
alization also offers enormous benefits for the rest of the world
community. However, TNCs use bribery to manipulate poorer, develop-
ing countries into misappropriating funds or ignoring important health
and safety regulations.37 '
Second, foreign bribery poses a threat to national security by impair-
ing relations with other countries. Trade agreements are strategically
used to maintain regional stability and reduce the possibility of war.
Most of the world's largest TNCs are from the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and Japan. Foreign bribery by these corporations directly
threatens relations between these countries because such conduct may
foster distrust and resistance to foreign commerce.
Finally, foreign bribery on a grand scale implicates the most funda-
mental principles of international law. Just as genocide moves murder
into the realm of universally actionable rights, so could a grand bribery
scheme. After seeing the recent worldwide effects of Enron, MCI World-
com, and other corporate corruption scandals, it is entirely plausible that
a bribery scheme might also meet this demanding standard. Arguably,
the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program and the A.G. Siemens fiascos already
have.
372. Id. (citing Flores, 414 F3d at 249).
373. Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980)).
374. See Shamir, supra note 7, at 637 (discussing the need of poor nations to attract and
keep foreign investment is often paid for the citizens of the poor nation).
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2. Aiding and Abetting
Alternatively, several circuit courts have recognized there is secon-
dary liability for corporate acts facilitating the most shocking jus cogens
offenses. Such secondary liability, according to the Second Circuit in
Kadic v. Karadizic, requires the private actor to be operating under color
of law, meaning "act[ing] together with state officials or with significant
state aid. 375
As discussed earlier, the district court in Chowdhury seemed to insist
that aiding and abetting involve an underlying state policy rather than
merely a state enticed to further a private actor's unlawful agenda. How-
ever, other courts have adopted a much broader concept of "aiding and
abetting" that would encompass the bribery of foreign officials. For ex-
ample, the Eleventh Circuit has extended the reach of corporate
conspiracy liability to a large number of violations of international law.1
76
Had the jury verdict gone the other way, the defendant, Drummond Oil,
would have been held liable for aiding and abetting not only the extraju-
dicial killing of three labor union leaders but also the "denial of
fundamental rights to associate and organize. 377 And in the next trial, it
very well might.
Furthermore, courts recognize this aiding and abetting list will con-
tinue to grow as international criminal law continues to evolve. For
example, although the Filartiga court held in 1980 that torture was ac-
tionable only if there was state action, the Sosa court implied that even
isolated torture is now likely a violation. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
held there is no need for a public official to be involved for a private in-
dividual to be responsible under CIL for the international crime of
torture.379
375. Kadic v. Karadizic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F3d 377 (2d.
Cir. 1996), remanded to Jane Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 9878, 1996 WL 194298 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1996), cert. denied, Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); see also Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303,
1316 (1 th Cir. 2008).
376. See Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (1lth Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
377. See generally Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 E3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). But see
Presbyterian Church v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 663, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(dismissing the case because under the law of nations, "the offense of conspiracy is limited to
conspiracies to commit genocide and to wage aggressive war," neither of which were alleged
in the complaint).
378. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
379. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-A, Judgment, T 148 (June 12, 2002).
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It is indisputable that foreign bribery is one of the most common
methods of aiding and abetting other more shocking crimes 380 For
example, bribery played a prominent role in the judicial execution of two
prominent activists in the recent Wiwa case which was eventually set-
tled.38' Although bribery is frequently mentioned in passing as a
precursor to severe human rights violations, the bribe itself is seldom
analyzed as a potential violation of the law of nations.382
More recently, however, in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, the
Second Circuit allowed "aiding and abetting" to proceed as CIL
violations under ATS in large part because of language in the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention.8 In fact, acceptance of bribes has been used
as evidence of "willful blindness" to hold nations liable for torture under
other laws.384 In the end, however, proceeding under a secondary liability
theory ignores the unmistakable fact that foreign bribery itself offends
the law of nations and should be included in the lists of jus cogens of-
fenses permissible under the ATS.
3. Satisfying the Procedural Safeguards
A third issue always lurking in these cases is the necessity of satisfy-
ing procedural safeguards-particularly, courts must assess the
sufficiency of the complaint and ensure that it states a claim for relief.
Since the Supreme Court articulated the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility
standards, procedural requirements have posed a challenge to plaintiffs
bringing ATS claims. For example, the district court in Chowdhury v.
380. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d. 1371 (U.S. J.P.M.L.
2008) (alleging the corporation paid money to paramilitaries in the context of war crimes and
crimes against humanity).
381. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, Royal Dutch Petroleum Col. v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (2001). Ken Saro-
Wiwa was hanged after being convicted of murder by a special tribunal. Id. at 92. Plaintiffs
argued that Shell bribed witnesses and conspired with Nigerian authorities to orchestrate the
trial. Id. at 92-93.
382. Id.; see also Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1047 (1996); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F Supp. 2d 457,
465 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
383. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
Am. Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
384. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding a case in which an
illegal alien was seeking relief from removal to China, and recognizing that the acceptance of
bribes by Chinese police to allow refugees to pass through checkpoints constituted evidence of
China's acquiescence or awareness of the torture). In this unique case, the government offi-
cial's acceptance of the bribe from a refugee trying to escape across the border constituted
proof that the official knew or should have known the bribe-giver was facing an imminent
threat. Id. at 1187. However, bribes also were alleged to have been directly responsible for
facilitating the torture or other human rights abuses. See Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887.
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WorldTel Bangledesh Holding, Ltd. suggested bribery could possibly
give rise to an ATS claim, but found the particular allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint too vague and ambiguous to withstand dismissal. 3
Moreover, the principles of comity, exhaustion, and forum non con-
veniens also pose a challenge in ATS cases. These doctrines require
deference to foreign courts to the extent courts exist that have competing
jurisdiction.3 6 Although international fora are generally not open to
claims by private persons,3 7 there is some precedent for handling cases
predicated on bribery in international fora. For example, in the late
1920s, a case involving two Mexican officers who shot a French national
for failure to pay them a bribe was handled using international arbitra-
tion.388 Mexico was held responsible for their actions despite the fact that
the officers were acting outside the scope of their authority."'
More recently, the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ISCID) has arbitrated several cases involving
bribery allegations.390 For example, in 2008 Argentina asked ISCID to
reopen an earlier arbitration proceeding with Siemens and revise a $217
million arbitration award secured in 2007 by the German TNC because
Argentina wanted arbitrators to consider new evidence that the disputed
contract with Siemens for a national identification card system was se-
cured by bribery.39 ' This came on the heels of Siemens entering plea
agreements with German and U.S. authorities, in which they admitted to
having paid several high-level Argentine officials multi-million dollar
bribes.3 92
Finally, ATS claims predicated on foreign bribery must not imper-
missibly interfere with U.S. foreign policy. The Sosa court stated that
courts should give "serious weight" to the Executive Branch's view of
the impact on foreign policy that permitting an ATS suit would likely
have in a given case or type of case.393 Fortunately, most of the
385. Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y.
2008).
386. See Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127-28 (D. Colo.
2004).
387. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 906 cmt. a (1987).
388. Caire v. United Mexican States (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 516, 517
(1929).
389. Id.
390. See Vega, supra note 9, at 457-58 (citing three ISCID cases involving bribery).
391. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Argentina Takes the Offensive as Siemens Pleads Guilty
to Corruption Charges, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Dec. 23, 2008, http://
www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2008/12/23/argentina-takes-the-
offensive-as-siemens-pleads-guilty-to-corruption-charges.aspx (last visited Feb. 7,
2010).
392. Id.
393. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
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considerable body of international law against foreign bribery focuses on
the bribe-giver not the bribe-taker. For example, the court in RSM Pro-
duction noted that the OECD Convention only requires signatory
countries to pass legislation making it a crime for an individual to bribe a
foreign official. The OECD Convention does not attempt to regulate the
behavior of foreign public officials directly.94 Of the seven international
conventions addressing foreign bribery, only one, the UNCAC, extends
liability to public officials. 395 Therefore, there is little chance a federal
court would hold that a foreign public official acted in direct violation of
the international law.396
Consequently, cases predicated on foreign bribery do not necessarily
create any political question problems. In the matter of Environmental
Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., the plaintiff alleged its competitors
had obtained a Nigerian defense contract through bribery of Nigerian
government officials. 397 The district court requested a Bernstein letter,
that is, an opinion from the State Department on whether the act of state
doctrine should be applied in the circumstances presented by a particular
case. The State Department's Legal Advisor responded by stating, in per-
tinent part, that "the State Department [was] satisfied that the conduct of
American foreign policy relative to Nigeria [would] not be compromised
by orderly federal court adjudication of ETC's lawsuit.""39 Although the
appellate court initially reversed the district court's decision, ultimately
the Supreme Court held the act of state doctrine does not apply because
neither the claim nor any asserted defense required the court to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign.39
394. See OECD Convention, supra note 335, art. 1(1). This Convention is also refer-
enced by name in the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which was promulgated by the U.N. Sub-
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and approved by the U.N.
Economic and Social Council. See U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 22d mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/I 2/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003).
395. UNCAC, supra note 145, at art. 15.
396. It should be noted that I disagree with this proposition as a matter of public policy.
The historical notion of equality among states requires at the same time a broad conception of
instrumentality for purposes of liability and a narrow conception of instrumentality for pur-
poses of sovereign immunity. Once those fundamental principles are properly understood, it is
an easy task to extend international law to hold foreign officials liable as bribe-takers. On the
flip-side, there are compelling policy reasons why the United States should not be held liable
for bribing certain foreign officials to be informants and spies in prosecuting the war on terror-
ism or drugs or similar efforts.
397. Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
398. Id. at 1062.
399. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 405-06.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout history, bribery of foreign officials was commonly un-
derstood to violate the law of nations. However, under modem ATS case
law, human rights violations have been generally perceived as the greater
threat to our international community. Out of fear of the slippery slope,
courts have narrowly circumscribed ATS lawsuits around these more
sensationalized types of ATS claims and refused to open the door to any
outliers raising only economic torts. As a result, foreign victims of brib-
ery have been left without redress in U.S. courts. Ironically, until they
are held liable for it, TNCs will continue to use bribery to facilitate the
most horrid crimes against humanity. There is no reason to forego the
opportunity provided by the ATS to use international civil litigation to
help prevent the corruption of government officials where it starts, with
bribery and the greed it fosters.
Balancing on the precipice of judicial cognizance and caution, fed-
eral courts are uniquely positioned to enforce CIL against foreign
bribery. There is ample evidence to support judicial cognition of the pro-
hibition against foreign bribery as an international norm with the
possibility of a common law remedy against TNCs. Over half a dozen
international anti-bribery conventions condemn bribe-giving in no uncer-
tain terms, and virtually every country on the face of the earth has
outlawed it. At the same time, enough of Vattel's doctrine of sovereign
equality has been preserved in the substantive and procedural parts of the
federal common law governing international disputes, including the act
of state doctrine and other modem conflict of laws principles, to ensure
that federal courts will exercise the necessary judicial caution to prevent
ATS-actions predicated on foreign bribery from unduly burdening for-
eign relations or foreign commerce.
